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THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE "SEPARATE
BUT EQUAL" DOCTRINE*
Joseph S. Ransmeiert
".

nor shall any State . . . deny to any person within

its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."-Four-

teenth Amendment, section I.

separation by force of law is a historic institution in the
United States, constitutional and statutory provisions of many of
the states making provision for it.1 The types of relation which
have been the subject of race separation law vary from the B.eeting contacts of fellow passengers on common carriers2 or of patrons of places of
public recreation and amusement' to the more enduring contacts of
fellow students at educational institutions4 and the more intimate relationship of marriage partners. 5 Although it might have been anticipated that the Fourteenth Amendment, construed in the Slaughterhouse Cases6 as primarily designed for the protection of the Negro race,
would have raised a question as to the validity of state-enforced segregation, 7 the impact of the amendment was rather to require that the separated group be offered facilities or services substantially equal to those
available to the white population. 8 This is the "separate but equal" rule.

R

ACIAL

"' An original draft of the present paper was prepared in conjunction with the Constitutional Law seminar at the University of Michigan Law School in the fall of 1950. The
author gratefully acknowledges his indebtedness to Professor Kauper who conducted that
seminar. Conclusions, however, are the author's.
t Assistant professor of economics, Dartmouth College (on leave) and senior student,
University of Michigan Law School.-Ed.
lSee KoNVITZ, THE CoNSTITUTION .AND CIVIL RIGHTS 230-241 (1947) for a compilation of state laws compelling or permitting segregation. See generally, l MYRDAL, AN
AMERICAN DILEMMA, c. 29 (1944).
2 For a listing of state statutes which either require or prohibit racial separation upon
public agencies of transportation, see Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 at 382, n. 24, 66
S.Ct. 1050 (1946). See also KoNVITZ, THE CoNSTlTtl'I'ION .AND CIVIL RIGHTS 234
(1947) and MANGUM, LEGAL STATUS OP THE NEGRO 182n and 207n (1940).
a KoNVITZ, THE CoNSTlTtl'I'ION .AND CIVIL RIGHTS 234 et seq. (1947).
4 MANGUM, LEGAL STATUS oP THE NEGRO 79 et seq. (1940).
5 A listing of statutes of 29 states barring interracial marriage appears in 58 YALE L.J.
472 at 480-481 (1949). See also MANGUM, LEGAL STATUS OP THE NEGRO, c. IO (1940).
6 Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. (83 U.S.) 36 at 81, 21 L. Ed. 394 (1873).
7 There is a wealth of excellent recent literature as to the purposes sought to be obtained in the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment. See especially Fairman, "Does
the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding,"
2 STANFORD L. REv. 5 (1949) and Frank and Munro, ''The Original Understanding of
'Equal Protection of the Laws,'" 50 CoL. L. REv. 131 (1950). See also Tussman and
tenBroek, "The Equal Protection of the Laws," 37 CALIP. L. REv. 341 (1949). A traditional authority is FLACK, THE AnoPTION OP THE FouRTEENTH AMENDMENT (1908).
8 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. 1138 (1896). But some of the states themselves attacked segregation by e}.-press statutes. See, for example, Michigan Public Acts of
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Recent cases9 in which the Court has overthrown enforced separation in public higher education on the ground of inequality but without
consideration of the merits of the separate but equal rule have been the
occasion for an outpouring of law review discussion on the subject.10
The present paper is a part of this stream. Its purpose is two-fold: 6.rst,
to set forth the judicial history of the modern separate but equal rule,
noting its pre-Fourteenth Amendment origin and the rather uncritical
manner in which courts permitted it to infiltrate its way from one area
of the law to another; and second, to present brieHy a scheme of analysis
for constitutional review of the rule if the Supreme Court should be
prevailed upon to consider the question.

I
THE DEVELOPMENT.OF THE SEPARATE BUT EQUAL RuLE

Formulation of the Rule. The starting point for a review of the
law of state-enforced segregation must be the century-old Massachusetts
case of Roberts v. City of Boston.11 Ardent New England Abolitionists, even before the Civil War, had set their sights beyond mere legal
freedom for the Negro, aiming rather at full civil equality for him.
Through their efforts, the Massachusetts legislature enacted a statute assuring the Negro a right to public education by awarding an action for
1885, No. 130, "An Act to protect all citizens in their civil rights,'' applied by the court
in Ferguson v. Gies, 82 Mich. 358 at 364, 46 N.W. 718 (1890). The President's Com·
mittee on Civil Rights reported that, ''Eighteen states have statutes prohibiting discrimina•
tion in places of public accommodation." To SBc'CJRB THBSB RIGHTS 76 (1947). For a
recent addition to this general class of legislation, see 18 N.Y. Laws (McKinney) art. 15,
"State Commission Against Discrimination,'' particularly §296.
9 Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 70 S.Ct. 848 (1950) and McLaurin v. Oklahoma
State Regents, 339 U.S, 637, 70 S.Ct. 851 (1950).
10 See Green, "Fourteenth Amendment and Racial Segregation in State Supported
Schools," 24 TBMPLB L.Q. 222 (1950); Waite, ''The Negro in the Supreme Court: Five
Years More," 35 MINN. L. R:sv. 625 at 628 (1951); "Fall of an Unconstitutional Fiction:
The Separate but Equal Doctrine," 30 NBB. L. R:sv. 69 (1950); "Segregation in Schools
of Higher Leaming," 3 S.C. L.Q. 71 (1950); "Segregation of Negroes in Public Schools,"
24 So. CAL. L. R:sv. 74 (1950); "Implications of Recent Cases on Education of Minority
Racial Groups," 3 Umv. FLA. L. R:sv. 358 (1950); and see also 17 BnooKLYN L. R:sv.
134 (1950); 64 HARv. L. R:sv. 129 (1950); 26 NOTRB DAMB LAWYBR 81, 134 (1950);
27 N.D. L. Rsv. 300 (1951).
11 5 Cush. (59 Mass.) 198 (1849). Modern decisions upholding racial segregation
find their authority in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. 1138 (1896), discussed
infra p. 212. But Plessy rests ultimately on Roberts. Hence, as will appear, the development
of the law of enforced segregation might well be discussed under such a heading as ''The
Roberts Case and How it Grew." For a discussion of the background of the Roberts case
on which the facts here stated are largely based, see Frank and Munro, "The Original
Understanding of 'Equal Protection of the Laws,'" 50 CoL. L. R:sv. 131 at 136 (1950).
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damages to any person "unlawfully excluded"12 from the public schools.
When the City of Boston sought to meet the statute by establishing separate schools for Negro children, the Abolitionists saw in the move an attempt to avoid precisely the grant of equality at which the statute had been
directed. Accordingly, bringing suit in behalf of a Negro girl required to
attend a separate school, they challenged the Boston ordinance as in conflict with the Bill of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution.13 The nub
of their argument, developed by Charles Sumner as counsel for plaintiff, was that the Massachusetts constitutional provision that men are
''born equal" necessarily means that they are equal in their rights before
the law, and that it is beyond the power of the law to make distinctions
among equal men.14 The argument was rejected. Observing that the
school committee had reached its decision reasonably and without ap. parent prejudice, the court found no necessary incompatibility between
a system of separate schools and full "civil and social"15 equality for
Negroes.
Sumner's thesis in the Roberts case was a bold one. It was put forward at a time when slavery was a firmly established institution in many
of the states, when even in the "free states" the rights of the Negro had
See also Sweatt v. Painter, Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Case #44, In
the Supreme Court of the United States, Oct. Term, 1949 at 5-7.
12 Mass. Acts,
13 Part I, Art.

1845, c. 214.
I. "All men are bom free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and
defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property;
in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness." Part I, Art. VI. "No
man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or
particular or exclusive privileges, distinct from those of the community, than what arises
from the consideration of services rendered to the public; • • • ." Mass. Constitution of
1780.
14 Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Sweatt v. Painter, Case #44, In the
Supreme Court of the United States, Oct. Term, 1949 at 6.
15 Shaw, C. J., writing for the Court said in part:
"Conceding therefore in the fullest manner, that colored persons ••• are entitled by
law, in this commonwealth, to equal rights, constitutional and political, civil and social,
the question then arises, whether the regulation in question, which provides separate
schools for colored children, is a violation of any of these rights.
" ••• the law has vested the power in the committee to regulate the system of distribution and classification; and when this power is reasonably exercised, without being abused
or perverted by colorable pretenses, the decision of the committee must be deemed conclusive. The committee, apparently upon great deliberation, have come to the conclusion, that
the good of both classes of schools will be best promoted, by maintaining the separate
primary schools for colored and for white children, and we can perceive no ground to
doubt, that this is the honest result of their experience and judgment.
"It is urged that this maintenance of separate schools tends to deepen and perpetuate
the odious distinction of caste, founded in a deep-rooted prejudice in public opinion. This
prejudice, if it exists, is not created by law, and probably cannot be changed by law.
Roberts v. City of Boston, 5 Cush. (59 Mass.) 198 at 206, 209 (1849).
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traditionally been regarded as limited, and when the Negro had no general rights of citizenship. Indeed, in recognition of these very facts, the
Supreme Court at about this time laid down its momentous decision in
the Dred Scott case.16 Yet with only the Massachusetts constitutional
provisions and the egalitarian philosophy of the time to go on, Sumner
sought to persuade the Court that for men to be created equal meant
that they were entitled to inherent equality of their legal rights. It
was Sumner's great achievement to bring about the incorporation into
the law of his major premise;17 but the victory was a costly one, for
the Court's refusal to find inequality in the practice which he challenged determined the case against him and set a precedent which is
still cited today by those seeking judicial authority for segregation.18
Following the civil war, and after the adoption of the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, the Supreme Court of Ohio
was confronted with a challenge to its system of segregated schools
under both the state and federal constitutions.19 The challenge under
the Ohio Constitution was readily disposed of on the basis of established case authority; 20 but the invocation of the Fourteenth Amendment raised new questions. 21 This the court recognized, and, although
plaintiff's argument had been rested primarily upon the privileges and
immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the court did not
confine its attention to that clause but took occasion to uphold segregated education under the amendment generally so long as full equal16 Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. (60 U.S.) 393 at 407, 15 L. Ed. 691 (1857). In his
opinion in this case, Chief Justice Taney observed that Negroes had " ••. for more than
a century before been regarded as beings of an inferior order; and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they
had no rights which the white man was bound to respect."
17 Thus, the Court conceded that Negroes were entitled to equal political, civil and
social rights. Note 15 supra.
18 Mendez v. Westminster School District, (9th Cir. 1947) 161 F. (2d) 774 at 779
affirming (D.C. Cal. 1946) 64 F. Supp. 544.
19 State ex rel. Games v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 198 (1872). At about the same time
the Arkansas court, in giving a statutory interpretation, had impliedly approved separate
public education, but the Fourteenth Amendment had not been considered. County Court
v. Robinson, 27 Ark: 116 (1871).
20 State ex rel. Games v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 198 at 207-208 (1872) citing State
ex rel. Directors v. Cincinnati, 19 Ohio 178 (1850) and Van Camp v. Board of Education, 9 Ohio St. 407 (1859).
21 Thus, plaintiff argued, "There is no longer in this country, or in any State in this
country, ••. an intermediate class of people standing half-way between citizens and aliensborn in the country, and yet not of the country-whose position is undefined and whose
rights are doubtful and undetermined." State ex rel. Games v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 198
at 199 (1872).
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ity of facilities were provided. 22 vVhile the Roberts decision was not
cited, this Ohio opinion stands foursquare with it.
It was hardly to be expected that the war between the states and the
adoption of the constitutional amendments would end discrimination
and prejudice against Negroes. Despite contemporary debate on a federal civil rights bill and the ultimate enactment of the civil rights legislation,23 it was not surprising that discriminatory legislation against the
new freedman continued to be adopted by many of the states;24 at the
same time it was equally to be expected that much of this legislation
would find challenge in the courts. In the resulting decisions, the
Roberts and McCann cases served as precedents for judicial approval
of the rapid spread of legally-enforced separation of the Negro from
the white race. In 1874, the Indiana court found in the McCann decision of the Ohio court, "... a court distinguished for its learning and
ability,"215 compelling authority supporting segregated education in In22 The court observed that the amendment settles all doubts as to the right of colored
people to citizenship and equal protection of the laws. But, it continued, " ••• neither of
these was denied to them in this State before the adoption of the amendment. At all
events, the statutes classifying the youth of the State for school purposes on the basis of
color, and the decisions of this court in relation thereto, were not at all based on a denial
that colored persons were citizens, or that they are entitled to the equal protection of the
laws. It would seem, then, that these provisions of the amendment contain nothing conHicting with the statutes authorizing the classification in question, nor the decisions heretofore made touching the point in controversy. Nor do we understand that the contrary is
claimed by counsel in the case." State ex rel. Games v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 198 at 209
(1872). The argument quoted is the sum of the court's discussion of the impact of the
federal equal protection clause upon enforced race separation, the opinion thereafter turning to consider the applicability of the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the clause which plaintiff in the case had"••• relied on." 21 Ohio St. 209.
Yet the case became an important authority when separate schools were challenged under
the equal protection clause in other states. See, for example, Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327
at 354 (1874) discussed immediately below.
2 3 Infra note 90.
2 4 1 FLEMING, DocuMENTARY HrsTORY OF REcoNSTRUCTION, c. 4 (1906) and see
also 41 YALE L.J. 1212 at 1213 (1932) and 1 MYRDAL, AN AMEruCAN DILEMMA 579
et seq. (1944).
25 Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327 at 357 (1874), one justice dissenting, the majority
quoting the McCann decision at length. The opinion is a startling interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Quoting from its own earlier opinion in State v. Gibson, 36 Ind.
389 at 393 (1871), the court asserted that "The fourteenth amendment •.• did not enlarge the powers of the Federal Government, nor diminish those of the states. The inhibitions against the states doing certain things have no force and effect. They do not prohibit the states from doing any act they could have done without them." Cory v. Carter,
48 Ind. at 353. The court also found no ground for any federal interest in the legislative
classification of students according to race, education being purely a matter of domestic
concern. 48 Ind. at 360, 362. But the court did find support for Indiana's separate schools in
the separate school system established by Congress in the District of Columbia ( 48 Ind. at
365) although the equal protection clause (except as impliedly incorporated in the due
process concept) was not applicable to the Federal Government.
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diana. At about the same time, the question arose in California, and
the same decision was reached, decisive authority here being found in
the Roberts case from which the California Supreme Court quoted at
length.26 In 1878, when challenge was made of separate schools which
had been set up in Louisiana in the face of a state constitutional provision requiring that all children be admitted to the common schools
without distinction of race or color and expressly prohibiting separate
schools, , the federal court ID;geniously found the practice valid
under the force of the McCann and DeCuir2 7 precedents and, in any
event, concluded that no federal question was presented.28 Five years
later (1883) when the issue came before the New York court, the majority again returned to the Roberts decision, finding in it weighty
authority2 9 although Judge Danforth filed a vigorous dissent condemning segregated education as in fact a discrimination of the very type
"... against which the law is now directly aimed."80 This New York
decision was cited by the Missouri court, in the important Lehew
case81 on the same issue in 1891, although again Roberts was referred to
as persuasive inasmuch as it had been decided "... under a constitu26 Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36 (1874). The opinion was without dissent though one
justice did not participate and one concurred in a separate opinion based on a defect in
the pleadings. Said the court of the Roberts case which it discusses at length (at 52-56),
"[It is] ••• decisive of the present controversy." In 1880, however, the California legislature repealed the code provisions authorizing separate schools for different races, and in
Tape v. Hurley, 66 Cal. 473, 6 P. 129 (1885) the appellate court construed the revised
code to preclude the exclusion of a Chinese or Mongolian child from a "white school."
The legislature in 1885 then authorized separate schools for Chinese and Mongolian children (but not for Negroes). See Wysinger v. Crookshank, 82 Cal. 588 at 591, 23 P. 54
(1890). Throughout these cases, the California courts took the consistent view that the
Fourteenth Amendment did not defeat the legislative power to require separate schools.
27 Bertonneau v. Bd. of Directors of City Schools, (C.C. D.La. 1878) 3 Fed. Cas. 294
at 296, No. 1,361. The case of Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485, 24 L. Ed. 547 (1877)
is discussed on p. 210 infra. The Court's citation in Bertonneau is to Justice Clifford's concurring opinion in DeCuir which in turn cited the Roberts case, among others. 95 U.S.
485, 491 at 505.
28 Bertonneau v. Bd. of Directors, (C.C. D.La. 1878) 3 Fed. Cas. 294 at 296. Compare the view of the Indiana court in Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327 at 360 (1874): "The
system of common schools in this state ••. is purely a domestic institution, and is subject
to the exclusive control of the constituted authorities of the state."
2 9 People ex rel. King v. Gallagher, 93 N.Y. 438 (1883). The court divided four to
two. Petitioner had raised the privileges and immunities clause as well as equal protection.
The former the majority disposed of by observing that education was a privilege conferred
by the state, rather than a right, and hence that the state could at will entirely withdraw
it or withdraw it from any class. Id. at 447. As for equal protection, the court held that
the intent of the clause was not to " •.• regulate or interfere with the social standing or
the privileges of the citizen." It adcled, "The attempt to enforce social intimacy and intercourse· between the races, by legal enactments,• would probably tend only to embitter the
prejudices if such there are, which exist between them, and produce an evil instead of a
good result." Id. at 448. Compare the language of Judge Shaw's opinion in Roberts v.
City of Boston, 5 Cush. (59 Mass.) 198 at 209 which is quoted in note 15 supra and
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tional provision similar to the Fourteenth Amendment as to the question in hand."32
Although the Roberts case was perhaps the leading authority supporting racial separation in public education during most of the latter
nineteenth century, Sumner's argument in that case for equality of
right had not been wholly lost. When Roberts was cited, the courts
ordinarily interpreted it as authorizing no gross discrimination in the
educational advantages offered to the two races. 33 Where gross inequality existed, there was a disposition to impeach the separation although
the showing of inequality had to be clear and convincing.34 Even this
disposition, however, was not unanimously shared by all courts.35
The decisions discussed above indicate rather wide-spread holdings
in the state courts as to the constjtutionality under the_ Fourteenth
Amendment of enforced racial separation in public education. In the
field of public transportation, racial segregation was also subjected to judi0

which the New York court cites at 453. For a later New York case to the same effect as
Gallagher, see Cisco v. School Board, 161 N.Y. 598, 56 N.E. 81 (1900) where separate
schools were challenged on the basis of intervening New York law.
so King v. Gallagher, 93 N.Y. 438, 458 at 465. The case had raised issues both under
the Fourteenth Amendment and the New York Civil Rights Act of 1873, c. 186. Judge
Danforth declared that the object of the Fourteenth Amendment included " ••• exemption
[of Negroes] against any discrimination which either implies legal inferiority in civil society or lessens the security of their rights ••• ," and added that a segregated school system
" ••• is directly calculated to keep alive the prejudice against color from which spring
many of the evils for the suppression of which the fourteenth amendment and our own
civil rights statute were enacted." Id. at 458, 465.
s1 Lehew v. Brummell, 103 Mo. 546 at 552, 15 S.W. 765 (1891).
s2 Id. at 553. But neither the express terms nor the background of the two constitutional provisions warrant this comparison. The Missouri court here went further in seeking
to reason out a constitutional justification for separation than had most prior decisions in
point. Thus, it observed: ''But it will be said the classification now in question is one
based on color, and so it is; but the color carries with it natural race peculiarities which
furnish the reason for the classification." Id. at 551.
ss Claybrook v. City of Owensburg, (D.C. Ky. 1883) 16 F. 297 at 302.
3 4 Ibid.; Dawson v. Lee, 83 Ky. 49 (1885). For citations to many of these early cases
see 10 AM. Die., cent. ed., §§714-723, pp. 2133-2141. For some of the criteria by which
equality came to be judged, see note 86 infra.
85 Consider this cynical statement of the West Virginia court: ''The only privilege
that appears to be denied to colored children in this section is that of association with white
children, and vice versa. If it had been required that they be taught in the same school,
then it would have been a compulsory infringement of the rights of both, but as it is
now, it treats them both alike, and places them precisely on the same footing ••• [citing
cases, including Roberts]. Petitioner's counsel insists ••• because the legislature had failed
to make proper provision to afford equal facilities to colored children, that they are entitled
to attend the school provided for white children, on equal terms. Such a determination
would be, in effect, permitting the neglect of the legislature • • • to abrogate the Constitution, while it is the paramount duty of this court to see that they obey it. Therefore, the
circuit court could not do otherwise than refuse the prayer of the petition." Martin v.
Board of Education, 42 W.Va. 514 at 515-516, 26 S.E. 348 (1896).
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cial scrutiny and became accepted as valid public policy in many states
during the latter nineteenth century. In contrast to the development
in the education .field, in the case of transportation, attempts to challenge compulsory segregation failed signally to raise Fourteenth Amendment issues. Reference has been made above to the DeCuir case36 in
which the Supreme Court overthrew as a burden upon interstate commerce a Louisiana statute of the early reconstruction days as applied
to prohibit enforced racial separation upon a Mississippi River steamboat plying between New Orleans and Vicksburg.37 Subsequently,
when Mississippi sought to enforce a statute requiring railroads within
the state to provide equal, but separate, facilities for white and colored
patrons, the Supreme Court accepted the construction of the state
court that the act was applicable only to commerce within Mississippi
and upheld the enactment.38 The case again turned upon the Court's
interpretation of the commerce clause. It is significant that defendant
was a railroad company which raised no question of individual right
under the Fourteenth Amendment; indeed, the Court expressly observed that the issue of compulsion of passengers to ride in the separate
facilities to be provided was not an issue in the case.39 In the Civil
Rights Cases,4° the question of whether the Fourteenth Amendment
extended to authorize federal prohibition of race separation upon intrastate common carriers was directly raised. While the Court supplied a negative answer, this was based upon the theory that the amendment is restricted to state action and that carriers act as private parties.41 Hence,
86 Hall v.
87 While

DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1877).
the case turned upon an interpretation of the commerce clause, Justice
Clifford, in his concurring opinion (95 U.S. 485, 491 at 504-506), found support in the
Roberts case and subsequent state court decisions as to separate schools. The DeCuir decision, which essentially denied to Louisiana the power to prohibit segregation in interstate
commerce, was later cited as authority for state legislation requiring race separation on
interstate carriers in their intrastate operations. See, for example, C. & 0. R.R. v. Kentucky,
179 U.S. 388 at 390-391, 21 S.Ct. 101 (1900).
38 Louisville, N.O. and T. Ry. Co. v. Mississippi, 133 U.S. 587, IO S.Ct. 348 (1890).
3 9 " ••• there is no question of personal insult or alleged violation of personal rights.
The question is limited to the power of the State to compel railroad companies to provide,
within the state, separate accommodations for the two races." 133 U.S. at 589.
40 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 3 S.Ct. 18 (1883).
41 The Court declared, "Positive rights and privileges are undoubtedly secured by the
Fourteenth Amendment; but they are secured by way of prohibition against State laws and
State proceedings.•.•" The amendment does not extend to " .•• wrongful acts of individuals, unsupported by State authority in the shape of laws, customs, or judicial or executive proceedings." 109 U.S. 3 at 11 and 17. The Court expressly reserved decision as to
the power of Congress to prohibit racial segregation in interstate transportation. Id. at 19.
Justice Harlan, dissenting, emphasized the public nature of the callings subjected to control
by the challenged legislation. Id., 26 at 37-43 and 53. See infra note 133 as to concept
of "state action."
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these cases provide no authority for state law enforcing race separation.
Additional decisions in the state courts upholding segregated transportation might be cited, but since these typically avoided Fourteenth Amendment issues, they would avail little in the present discussion. 42
While there was a general disposition among the state courts to
uphold statutory segregation of the races during the latter nineteenth
century, several courts (primarily in the midwestem states) took an
opposite position. Ordinarily their decisions were based upon interpretations of state constitutions or civil rights acts rather than the
Fourteenth Amendment, but the policy discussions of these opinions
often would have been directly in point, had the amendment in fact
been at issue. 43 In Board of Education v. Tinnon44 the Kansas court
overthrew segregated education on the ground that the legislature had
not authorized it, but made clear its view that the policy of the times
was to"... abolish all distinctions" 45 on account of race or color. Even
stronger, perhaps, was the judgment of the Michigan Court in upholding the application of the civil rights act in that state to prohibit racial
segregation in public eating establishments. When the Roberts case
42 For citations to many of these early cases, see Morrison v. State, 116 Tenn. 534
at 549-550, 95 S.W. 495 (1906) upholding a Tennessee statute requiring separation of
white and Negro passengers on street cars. Where the Fourteenth Amendment was considered, primary attention was given to the privileges and immunities clause. Morrison v.
State, 116 Tenn. 534 at 554-555 and cf. State ex rel. Games v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 198
at 209-211 (1872).
43 Thus, in overthrowing separate schools in Iowa, the supreme court of that state
declared "••• all the youths are equal before the law, and there is no discretion vested in
the board of directors or elsewhere, to interfere with or disturb that equality. • • • [T]he
board cannot . . • deny a youth admission to any particular school because of his or her
nationality, religion, color, clothing or the like." Clark v. Bd. of Directors, 24 Iowa 266
at 277 (1868). See also Smith v. Directors of School District, 40 Iowa 518 (1875) and
Dove v. Independent School District, 41 Iowa 689 (1875). In Illinois, separate schools
were held invalid under state law in People v. Board of Education, 101 ill. 308 (1882),
and similarly, statutory segregation in theaters was overthrown in Baylies v. Curry, 128
ill. 287, 21 N.E. 595 (1889). See also People ex rel. Workman v. Detroit, 18 Mich. 400
(1869), holding a state statute precluded exclusion of a Negro child from a "white" school.
44 26 Kan. l (1881). But later when separate education had been expressly provided
for by the legislature, the same Kansas court upheld it, citing inter alia Roberts, McCann,
and Plessy. Reynolds v. Board of Education, 66 Kan. 672 at 684-688, 691, 72 P. 274 (1903).
45 26 Kan. 1 at 18. The court answered the common assertion that since school boards
ordinarily had power to establish separate schools for boys and girls, they also had the
power to set up separate schools for white and colored children by declaring, "the premise
is not admitted and the conclusion is a non-sequitur." Id. at 22. This is certainly true, yet
the argument was an old one. See, for example, Roberts v. City of Boston, 5 Cush. (59
Mass.) 198 at 208 (1849); State ex rel. Garnes v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 198 at 201
(1872); Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327 at 360 (1874); People ex rel. King v. Gallagher, 93
N.Y. 438 at 449 (1883) and Lehew v. Brummell, 103 Mo. 546 at 551 (1891). The
Roberts opinion using this reasoning was subsequently cited by the Supreme Court in
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 at 544-545, 16 S.Ct. 1138 (1896).
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was cited to the Court as an authority for separate but equal facilities,
the Court impatiently dismissed it as an irrelevant precedent from
"ante-bellurn days." 46
Against the background of the cases we have discussed above and
other similar cases, there reached the Supreme Court of the United
States in 1896 the case of Plessy v. Ferguson. 41 In 1890 the State of
Louisiana had adopted a separate coach law. Petitioner was an intrastate railroad passenger of mixed descent, apparently % Caucasian and
¼ Negro, who refused to obey the instruction of the train conductor
that he remove himself to space reserved for colored passengers but
insisted upon a seat in the "white-' coach. Arrested and facing criminal
prosecution under the statute he raised the issue of the constitutionality
of state-enforced racial segregation upon a common carrier, pleading
both the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Arnendments.48 The Court, speaking through Justice Brown, found no merit in either contention. The
Thirteenth Amendment argument was brushed aside as scarcely deserving of serious consideration. 49 The Fourteenth Amendment argument was rejected by an analysis which may be recast and summarized
as follows: 50

First.

Mere separation of the races on a common carrier, so long
as equal facilities are p~ovided, is not discriminatory and brands the
separated group with no badge of inferiority.51 Congress itself, in
4 6 Said the court, "[The Roberts decision] • • • was made in the ante-bellum days
before the colored man was a citizen, and when, in nearly one half of the Union, he was
but a chattel. It cannot now serve as a precedent. It is but a reminder of the injustice and
prejudice of the time in which it was delivered." Ferguson v. Gies, 82 Mich. 358 at 364,
46 N.W. 718 (1890).
47 163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. 1138 (1896).
4 8 163 U.S. at 538-541. The case came up to the Supreme Court of the United
States after refusal by the Supreme Court of Louisiana of petitioner's application for a
writ of prohibition to. stay the criminal action against him on the ground of invalidity of
the Louisiana statute under the Federal Constitution.
49 "That [the challenged statute] does not conflict with the Thirteenth Amendment,
which abolished slavery and involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, is
too clear for argument." 163 U.S. at 542. The Court adds the assertion that a mere "legal
distinction" has no tendency to destroy legal equality of the races. Id. at 543. In support
of its holding relative to the inapplicability of the Thirteenth Amendment, the opinion
cites the Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. (83 U.S.) 36 (1873) and the Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3 at 24, 3 S.Ct. 18 (1883). Yet when the writer told his six-year-old son of
the subject of this paper and remarked that in some places colored children attend separate
schools, the youngster exclaimed, "Why that's slavery!"
0 0 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 at 543-552, 16 S.Ct. 1138 (1896). See "Is Racial
Segregation Consistent with Equal Protection of the Laws," 49 CoL, L. Rav. 629-639
(1949); Waite, "The Negro in the Supreme Court," 30 Mnm. L. Rav. 219 at 246
(1946); McGovney,, "Racial Residential Segregation," 33 CAI.ll'. L. Rav. 5 at 27, n. 94
(1945).
5 1 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 at 550-551, 16 S.Ct. 1138 (1896).
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adopting the separate school laws for the District of Columbia, endorsed
race separation by force of law.52 Any implication of colored inferiority
in such legislation is not"... by reason of anything found in the act,
but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon
it."53

Second. Separation of the races on common carriers concerns the
social relations of men rather than their civil or political rights. 54 A
sharp distinction is to be drawn between political and social rights, the
former standing upon a higher plane. 55 The social relations of passengers upon intrastate common carriers are subject to the ordinary exercise
of the state's police power, and racial separation is well established as
reasonable.56

Third.

Separation of the races may be appraised, as to its reasonableness, in terms of"... established usages, customs and traditions of
5 2 Id. at 545, 551. But Congress was not limited by an express equal protection clause.
Compare Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327 at 365, supra note 25. Further, had the Court
chosen the Civil Rights Acts or the legislation amending the charter of the Railroad Company which was at issue in Railroad Co. v. Brown, 17 Wall. (84 U.S.) 445 (1873), as
an index of congressional intent, a reverse conclusion would have been indicated.
The constitutionality of the separate school system of the District of Columbia has
recently been upheld against Fifth Amendment due process objections in Carr v. Corning,
(D.C. Cir. 1950) 182 F. (2d) 14, noted, 18 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 563 (1950). The
Roberts case and its progeny were cited, 182 F. (2d) 14 at 17, n. 6. The decision antedated the Supreme Court's recent determination of Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 70
S.Ct. 848 (1950), discussed infra at p. 235 et seq.
53 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 at 551, 16 S.Ct. 1138 (1896). Contrast the
dissent of Justice Harlan, at 557, as to the inherently discriminatory impact of enforced
separation of an unpopular minority from a dominant majority. The matter is also discussed
infra at p. 255.
Mid. at 551.
55 Id. at 545. But there is nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment to suggest such a
distinction where state action is involved. ·
56 The Court finds support for this proposition in the separate school decisions in the
state courts, quoting the Roberts decision at length. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 at
544-545, 16 S.Ct. 1138 (1896). Even Railroad Co. v. Brown, 17 Wall. (84 U.S.) 445
(1873), is cited in support of the assertion of local legislative control in the matter although
that case had denied the right of the railroad, serving the District of Columbia, to segregate
its Negro passengers under the terms of a congressionally issued charter, no Fourteenth
Amendment issues being involved. The Court finds virtually controlling the Louisville,
N.O. and T. Ry. case, 133 U.S. 587, IO S.Ct. 348 (1890) which it declares to be " •••
almost directly in point. •••" 163 U.S. at 547. Yet, as the Plessy opinion itself recognizes,
that case had construed the commerce clause and had not touched upon any questions as
to individual rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Additional authority for the Plessy
decision is found in a series of eleven cases, mostly in state courts, which had considered
complaints against enforced racial separation on common carriers. After examination of
each of these, Judge Waite has found that not one of them involved a holding as to the
validity under the Fourteenth Amendment of race separation by force of law. Waite,
"The Negro in the Supreme Court," 30 MINN. L. REv. 219 at 248-251 (1946). The
cases cited were West Chester and P. R.R. Co. v. Miles, 55 Pa. 209 (1867); Day v.
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the people, ... the promotion of their comfort, and the preservation of
the public peace and good order."117

Fourth.

Separation of the races simply lends legal recognition to
fundamental and ineradicable differences.118 The law is powerless to
remove distinctions of color, or to alleviate what prejudices, if any, may
exist as between the races.119
·
This restatement of the Plessy decision and our review of the case
authorities which preceded it reveal the manner in which segregation
became established at law in the face of the equal protection clause. That
the Massachusetts court in the Roberts case had not found separate
schools contrary to the state constitution in 1848 is perhaps understandable. But a half-century later when the Supreme Court was
considering the Plessy case in the light of a specific equal protection
clause and on the basis of a lengthy record of experience under enforced
separation, one might have hoped for a more penetrating analysis both
of the authorities and of the facts and issues at stake. While it would
profit little to spe~ulate as to the ultimate considerations which determined the Plessy result, 60 it is important to note the intellectual fraility
of the decision. 61
Owen, 5 Mich. 520 (1858); Chicago and N.W. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 55 ill. 185 (1870);
C. & O. and S.R. Co. v. Wells, 85 Tenn. 613, 4 S.W. 5 (1887); Memphis R.R. v.
Benson, 85 Tenn. 627, 4 S.W. 5 (1887); The Sue, (D.C. Md. 1885) 22 F. 843; Logwood
v. Memphis and C. R.R. Co., (C.C. Tenn. 1885) 23 F. 318; McGuinn v. Forbes, (D.O.
Md. 1889) 37 F. 639; People v. King, 110 N.Y. 418, 18 N.E. 245 (1888); Houck v
Southern Pac. R., (C.C. Texas 1888) 38 F. 226; Heard v. Ga. R.R. Co., 1 I.C.C. 428
(1888) and 3 I.C.C. 111 (1889).
57 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 at 550, 16 S.Ct. 1138 (1896). Is this to argue
that long-standing disregard of the equal rights of a minority gives color of legality to a
continuance of such disregard? Cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064 (1886).
58 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 at 551. Here the Court cites People ex rel. King
v. Gallagher, 93 N.Y. 438 (1883). But it does not consider whether the differences noted
are material to any permissible purpose of the contested legislation.
5 9 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 at 552. The reader will recognize this proposition
as drawn from Roberts v. City of Boston, 5 Cush. (59 Mass.) 198 (1849). But to the
contrary, see note 242 infra. In dissent, Justice Harlan argued that segregation tends to
" ••• keep alive a conflict of races." 163 U.S. 537 at 561.
60 No doubt the generality of enforced racial separation was an important consideration.
Luscky suggests that the Court still trembled at the far-reaching consequences of the Dred
Scott decision [19 How. (60 U.S.) 393 (1857)] and hesitated in any doubtful case to
extend federal authority at the expense of state power. Luscky, "Minority Rights and the
Public Interest," 52 YALE L.J. 1 at 25, n. 67 (1942). See also Watt and Orlikoff, "The
Coming Vindication of Mr. Justice Harlan," 44 ILL. L. REv. 13 at 19 (1949) and 2
WARIUlN, SuPRBME CotmT IN U.S. HxsTORY 608 (1947).
6 1 In sum, one may say of it that the authorities upon which it purports to be founded
are either superficial and obsolete, or irrelevant. Its differentiation of social and civil rights
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The Spread of the Separate but Equal Rule
During· the years following the Plessy decision, the rule of that case
was interpreted and applied in a wide variety of situations, some differing more or less sharply from intrastate passenger transportation, with
the effect of giving substantial judicial support to legally enforced race
separation.

Interstate Passenger Transportation. In the field of transportation
the most significant extension of the Plessy doctrine was its application
to interstate passenger travel. This was accomplished in two steps. The
first upheld the Kentucky separate coach law as applied to an interstate carrier operating within the State of Kentucky and carrying intrastate passengers. 62 Obliged then by Kentucky law to operate separate
facilities for intrastate colored passengers, the railroad apparently found
it convenient to insist upon segregation as to all colored passe;ngers.
Thus, when one Chiles, a Negro, purchased a first class ticket from
Washington, D. C. to Lexington, Ky., he was obliged, on changing
trains at Ashland to withdraw from a car reserved for white passengers
in which he had first seated himself and to take his place in a separate
coach reserved for Negroes. Chiles brought an action charging invasion of his rights as an interstate passenger. Faced with the barrier
of the DeCuir decision, 63 the Court could not hold Chiles subject to
the Kentucky statute. Rather it declared that, absent federal legislation
controlling the affairs of interstate carriers, the intent of Congress must
be presumed to be that the carrier provide its own rules. 64 Such rules
cannot be supported where state action is involved. Its justification of separation, as against
a challenge of unconstitutionality, on the ground of custom, is cynical. Its viewpoint as
to the impracticability of governmental intervention where prejudice exists is unduly
pessimistic.
62 C. & 0. Ry. Co. v. Kentucky, 179 U.S. 388, 21 S.Ct. 101 (1900). The Kentucky
Court of Appeals had construed the statute as applicable only to the provision of facilities
for intrastate passengers, and the Louisville, N.O. and T. R.R. v. Mississippi case, 133
U.S. 587, 10 S.Ct. 348 (1890), was closely in point. But the Supreme Court also cited
Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1877) as authority. Since the DeCuir case had resulted in
invalidation of the Louisiana statute as a burden upon interstate commerce, it would not
have been a great extension to have used it as authority to overthrow the Kentucky law.
68 Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1877).
64 Chiles v. C. & 0. R.R. Co., 218 U.S. 71 at 77, 30 S.Ct. 667 (1910). It is difficult
to understand the Court's assumption that Congress had not acted, inasmuch as the original
Interstate Commerce Act had included an "undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage" clause (Act of Feb. 4, 1887, 24 Stat. L. 381, c. 104, §3) which the Commission had
already invoked to protect Negro travelers from discrimination. See, for example, Heard
v. Ga. R.R. Co., 1 I.C.C. 428 (1888). This point is discussed by the Court in Mitchell
v. United States, 313 U.S. 80 at 95, 61 S.Ct. 873 (1941). But the Court cites the DeCuir
case, 95 U.S. 485 (1877), decided prior to the enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act
of 1887 in support of its conclusion that carriers are free to make their own rules concerning racial separation.
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are to be upheld if reasonable, and in gauging reasonableness the sentiment of the community for which the rules are ;made may properly be
considered. 65 Since sentiment in Kentucky suppor~ed separation, there
was adequate ground for the rules; 66 and since the evidence indicated
substantial equality of white and Negro accommodations,67 the rules
were reasonable. The Court found it unnecessary to consider the extent of permissible differences in facilities available to passengers of
different races under the separate but equal rule because it felt that
previous decisions had already dealt exhaustively with the matter.68

Public Education. Although ·the Plessy case involved an agency of
public transportation, we have seen that authority for the decision was
found in earlier state court cases concerning the constitutionality of
separate schools. It was to be expected that the Plessy doctrine would
now be applied to public education. Let us see how this came to pass.
Like many other southern states, the state of Georgia incorporated
into its constitution after the period of reconstruction a provision for
separate common schools. 69 The Board of Education of Richmond
County operated such schools on the primary level; since 1880 it
had also operated a high school for colored children and had subsidized
with tax money two private high schools for white children. Possessed of
65 "Regulations which are induced by the general sentiment of the community for
whom they are made and upon whom they operate cannot be said to be unreasonable."
Chiles v. C. & 0. R.R., 218 U.S. 71 at 77, 30 S.Ct. 667 (1910). Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. 1138 (1896) and C. & 0. R.R. v. Kentucky, 179 U.S. 388, 21 S.Ct.
101 (1900) are referred to as authority (218 U.S. 71 at 77) though the latter had considered no Fourteenth Amendment question, the fundamental issue in the Chiles case.
66 Chiles v. C. & 0. R.R., 218 U.S. 71 at 77, 30 S.Ct. 667 (1910).
67 Id. at 74. Although Chiles had purchased a through first-class ticket, when he
changed trains at Ashland, he was obliged to shift to a coach (apparently second-class) in
the forward part of which was a smoking compartment. Query whether it could reasonably
be found that the facilities offered Chiles were substantially equivalent to those available
to white travelers.
68 Id. at 77. The authorities here cited are Justice Clifford's concurring opinion in
Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 at 491 (1877) and Justice Brown's opinion in Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. 1138 (1896). Four years later the Court again refused
to consider a charge of inequality of separate facilities in interstate transportation, petitioners
on this occasion being five Negro citizens of Oklahoma who sought injunctive relief against
defendant railroad's operation under the separate coach law of that state. In the context
in which the case had arisen, the Court found the injunctive remedy improper, complainants having failed to demonstrate the insufficiency of their legal remedies to correct any
inequality which might exist. McCabe v. A.T. & S.F. R.R. Co., 235 U.S. 151 at 163-164,
35 S.Ct. 69 (1914).
ThE: Plessy doctrine was also invoked within a short time to uphold racial segregation
of passengers by local common carriers. See, for example, Morrison v. State, 116 Tenn.
534, 95 S.W. 495 (1906), citing both Plessy and Roberts, and Patterson v. Taylor, 51 Fla.
275, 40 s. 493 (1906).
69 Ga. Const., Art. VIII, §1 and see Ga. Ann. Code, tit. 32, §937 (Supp. 1947).
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inadequate primary facilities for an increasing colored school population, the Board voted in 1897 to discontinue the colored high school,
which had been attended by about 60 students, in order to make the
plant available for the primary education of 200 to 300 colored chil-dren. Three alternative high schools were available to the older colored
children at fees no higher than had been charged at the school closed
down. Complainant sought, and obtained in the trial court, an equity
decree enjoining further appropriations in aid of high school education
for white children in the absence of equal provision for colored scholars.
This decree was reversed by the Georgia Supreme Court7° which was,
in tum, affirmed by the United States Supreme Court. 71 Declaring that
in any event the injunctive remedy sought was improper,72 the Court,
speaking through Justice Harlan, 73 observed that the education of the
people was primarily a responsibility of the states and that federal
authority should intervene only when abuse of private right was "clear
and unmistakable." 74 The decision of the Board in the instant case
had been made in the interest of the greater number of colored children,
and the record did not establish that it had been made in bad faith or
out of hostility to the colored race. 75 Although at the argument complainants had challenged the separate school system, no decision was
required on this question for no such issue had been formed. 76 In sum,
the case stands for the proposition that inequality of educational facilities, reflecting the reasonable, good faith judgment of the responsible
authorities, is not a violation of the separate but equal rule. 77 Note,
70Board of Education v. Cumming, 103 Ga. 641, 29 S.E. 488 (1898).
71Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education, 175 U.S. 528, 20 S.Ct. 197
(1899). The facts stated are taken from the opinion of the Court.
12 Id. at 544.
73 It is ironical that Justice Harlan, a great champion of Negro rights, should be the
author of the Court's opinion in what came to be construed as a leading case standing for
the validity of segregated Negro education. See Watt and Orlikoff, "The Coming Vindication of Mr. Justice Harlan," 44 ILI.. L. RBv. 13 (1949). No doubt the Justice was
sincerely concerned at the doubtful educational prospects of the large number of Negro
primary students for whose education the Board was seeking to make belated provision.
Contrast his dissent in the Berea College case, infra note 79.
74 Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of Education, 175 U.S. 528 at 545, 20 S.Ct.
197 (1899).
75 Ibid.
76·Id. at 543-544. Said the Court: "It was said at the argument that the vice in the
common school system of Georgia was the requirement that the white and colored children
of the State be educated in separate schools. But we need not consider that question in
this case. No such issue was made in the pleadings."
77 See Waite, "The Negro in the Supreme Court," 30 Mnm. L. RBv. 219 at 255
(1946). See also 82 UNIV. PA. L. RBv. 157 at 162 (1933) where the author says: "Here
is a new test: Not mere factual inequality but inequality motivated by race hostility. This
test is not sound." But Justice Harlan's formulation is exactly consistent with the recent
development of the doctrine of equal protection. Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 at 8,
64 S.Ct. 397 (1944).
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however, that the Court here expressly refrained from passing upon the
more fundamental question of the applicability of the separate but equal
principle itself in the field of public education.
A decade later (1908), the problem of separate schools again came
before the Supreme Court. This time the question was raised by a private corporation, Berea College, challenging the relevant Kentucky
statute. Following the interpretation of the Kentucky Court of Appeals that the statute was separable and that, as applied to defendant
corporation, it represented a mere exercise of the state's reserved power
to amend the corporate charter of the college,78 the Supreme Court
upheld the criminal conviction of defendant under the statute without
touching any Fourteenth Amendment question of individual right. 79
Again in 1927 an issue arising from race separation in the public schools
rea·ched the Supreme Court. Here plaintiff, Gong Lum, brought suit
on behalf of his daughter, Martha, a native American citizen of pure
Chinese ancestry, challenging Mississippi's application of its separate
school law to exclude Martha from schools maintained for white children and to require her to attend a separate colored school. Arguing
that white residents, through separate schools, guarded their own children against dangerous association with Negroes, Gong asserted that it
was a denial of equal protection to expose the children of other races
to such risk. 80 The Court held that the petition was without merit since
it was unable to find that a common school education was not available
to Martha which would be equivalent to that available to white children. 81 Once again it is clear that the square issue of the power of the
state to separate the races in public education was not raised, Gong's objection being rather to the classification of Martha as a colored student.
The opinion of the· Court, however, handed down by Chief Justice
Taft, included dictum upon the constitutional validity of separate
schools. Thus, despite the express reservation of the Cumming case
78 Berea College v. Kentucky, 123 Ky. 209, 94 S.W. 623 (1906).
79Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 at 54, 29 S.Ct.-33 (1908). Justice Harlan,
reaching the issue which he had held was not involved in the Cumming case, 175 U.S.
528, 20 S.Ct. 197 (1899), observed in dissent that if the Court were to consider the
challenged statute valid here, as applied to individual citizens, this would seem to mean
that the state could also, if it liked, forbid Negroes and whites from meeting together in
the same church. "Have we become so inoculated with prejudice of race that an American
government, professedly based on the principles of freedom, and charged with the protection of all citizens alike, can make distinctions between such citizens in the matter of their
voluntary meeting for innocent purposes simply because of their respective races?" 211
U.S. 45 at 69.
80 Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 at 79, 48 S.Ct. 91 (1927). The facts here stated
are taken from the opinion of the Court.
s1 Id. at 84-85.
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and the narrowness of the Berea holding, it declared: 'Were this a new
question it would call for very full argument and consideration, but we
think that it is the same question which has been many times decided
to be within the constitutional power of the state legislature to settle
without intervention of the federal courts."82 So, without ever having
been pleaded, argued, or determined, the separate but equal rule as
applied to education was now declared to be the settled law of the
land. 83
In the light of the Plessy decision and of the education cases just
discussed, those who sought to challenge race separation in public education shifted their ground to the equality part of the separate but equal
rule. 84 Even under pre-Plessy interpretations, gross inequality of facilities (or a complete failure to provide colored schools) has led to invalidation of otherwise lawful separate white schools. 85 With the Plessy
endorsement by the highest court of the Roberts theory of necessary
equality, the meaning of "equality" itself became a major battleground
of litigation. Gradually the courts evolved a series of criteria by which
"equality" might be judged.86 Where these criteria were substantially
met, the mere fact of separation was not regarded under the authorities
as involving any constitutional defect. 87 Where they were not, how82 Id. at
88 Chief

85-86.
Justice Taft's first authority as to the "constitutionality" of separate but equal
public education was the Roberts case, 5 Cush. (59 Mass.) 198 (1849). He also cites
many of Roberts progeny in the state courts (275 U.S. 78 at 86), notes the Plessy
observation that separate schools have been widely held to be a valid exercise of legislative
power [Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 at 545, 16 S.Ct. 1138 (1896)] and quotes the
Plessy opinion with reference to the establishment of separate schools by Congress in the
District of Columbia, Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 at 86, 87.
84 An alternative line of attack upon enforced race separation which has sometimes
succeeded has ignored possible constitutional issues and demonstrated that separation has
been imposed without statutory warrant. See Crawford v. School District, 68 Ore. 388,
137 P. 217 (1913); Tape v. Hurley, 66 Cal. 473, 6 P. 129 (1885); Wysinger v. Crookshank, 82 Cal. 588, 23 P. 54 (1890); and Mendez v. Westminster School District, (D.C.
Cal. 1946) 64 F. Supp. 544 and (9th Cir. 1947) 161 F. (2d) 774, involving separate
schools; and Brown v. Board of Education, 106 W.Va. 476, 146 S.E. 389 (1928) involving
separate public libraries.
85 Cf. United States v. Buntin, (C.C. Ohio 1882) 10 F. 730.
86 See annotation at 103 A.L.R. 713 (1936) where discussion is had of the following
tests of equivalence of facilities, citing cases: (I) size of school; value of educational
property; (2) remoteness, inaccessibility or dangerous nature of location; (3) length of
school term; number of teachers; (4) courses of study available. See also 13 AM. & ENG.
ANN. CASES 342 (1907); "Constitutional Equality of School Privileges as a Civil Right,"
44 L. Ed. 262; and, more recently, "Segregation in Public Schools," 56 YALE L.J. 1059
at 1064-1065, and notes 41-43 (1947). The recent tendency of the Supreme Court to
tighten the rule of equality in public education is discussed infra at p. 232 et seq.
B1Bluford v. Canada, (D.C. Mo. 1940) 32 F. Supp. 707, app. dismissed (8th Cir.
1941) 119 F. (2d) 779; Graham v. Bd. of Educ., 153 Kan. 840, 114 P. (2d) 313 (1941).
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ever, such a defect did exist. In this case, the courts have ordinarily
afforded the educational authorities the alternative of remedying the
defect or of admitting colored students to the white school. 88

Real Estate. In addition to using the separate but equal rule in
passing upon the validity of race separation on public carriers or in public schools, many state courts have applied the canon to uphold the constitutional validity of arrangements to enforce racial separation as to
the ownership or occupancy of real estate. Such arrangements have
taken a variety of forms ranging from express ordinances of local municipal corporations and race restrictive covenants running with the land,
to less formal agreements or rules of local real estate boards and informal
agreements among property holders.89 In considering the applicability
of the separate but equal rule to these arrangements the courts have had
to take account of the special statutory provisions of the Civil Rights
Acts of 1866 and 1870 guaranteeing to all citizens equal rights to buy,
sell and hold real and personal property, and to make and enforce con. tracts. 00 It has further been necessary to consider whether the uniqueness which the law has long recognized as a characteristic attribute of
parcels of real property makes the separate but equal principle inherently inapplicable in this 6.eld.
The 6.rst Supreme Court test of the theory that the separate but
equal principle would give validity to residential racial segregation occurred in the case of Buchananv. Warley in 1917.91 The City of Louis88 Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631, 68 S.Ct. 299 (1948); Fisher v. Hurst,
333 U.S. 147, 68 S.Ct. 389 (1948); Hawkins v. Board of Control, (Fla. 1950) 47 S. (2d)
608; Wrighten v. Board of Trustees of University of South Carolina, (D.C. S.C. 1947)
72 F. Supp. 948.
89 McGovney, "Racial Residential Segregation," 33 CALIP. L. RBv. 5 (1945); Ming,
''Racial Restrictions and the Fourteenth Amendment," 16 Umv. Cm. L. RBv. 203 (1949);
Martin, "Segregation of Negroes,'' 32 MicH. L. RBv. 721 (1934). Cf. LAFAllGll, THI!
RA.ell QuBSTION AND THI! NBGRO (1943).
90 Rev. Stat. §1978 (derived from §1 of Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. L. 27)
provides, "All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and
Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and
convey real and personal property."
Rev. Stat. §1977 (derived from §16 of Civil Rights Act of 1870, 16 Stat. L. 144)
provides in part, "All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts ••• as is enjoyed
by white citizens. . • ."
Frank and Munro interpret the above provisions as making clear the intention that
racial segregation upon a geographic basis, as by residential race restrictive ordinances,
should be completely prohibited, and indicate the judgment of Congress that this could
be done under the Fourteenth Amendment. Frank and Munro, "The Original Understanding of 'Equal Protection of the Laws,'" 50 CoL. L. RBv. 131 at 150 (1950).
91Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 38 S.Ct. 16 (1917). The case is discussed by
Waite in "The Negro in the Supreme Court," 30 MINN. L. RBv. 219 at 269 (1946) and
by McGovney in ''Racial Residential Segregation,'' 33 CALIP. L. RBv. 5 at 30-33 (1945).
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ville by ordinance had prohibited a person of one race ( white or Negro)
from entering into occupancy of a residence in any block where the
greater number of residences were already occupied by persons of the
other race (Negro or white). Plaintiff, a white man, brought suit to
require defendant, a Negro, to perform specifically an agreement to
purchase certain real property from the occupancy of which defendant
was excluded under the ordinance. Defendant had incorporated into
the contract a provision that he agreed to purchase only if he had
" ... the right under the laws of the State of Kentucky and the City of
Louisville to occupy said property as a residence," 92 and he defended
the suit by invoking the race restrictive ordinance. The Kentucky Court
of Appeals had held for defendant,93 but on appeal to the Supreme
Court the ordinance was overthrown. The Court took note of the Civil
Rights Acts saying that these statutes dealt with ". . . fundamental
rights in property which it was intended to secure upon the same terms
to citizens of every race and color."94 The ordinance, though reciprocal
in phraseology, in fact was held to be discriminatory and at war with
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.95
While the Buchanan decision seemed to be definitive on the question of residential race separation ordinances, the Supreme Court of
Louisiana did not so regard it when challenge was made of a New
Orleans ordinance which forbade the establishment of new white or
Negro residences in certain districts without the consent of neighboring
residents of the opposite race. 96 Although the Court was somewhat embarrassed in attempting to distinguish the Buchanan case,97 it declared
that the issue had been foreclosed by the prior Plessy decision.98 Equal
protection of the laws was said to pertain to civil and political rather
than "social" rights, the ownership of a particular parcel of land being
implied to be a matter of purely social relations. 99 The Civil Rights
Acts of 1866 and 1870 were considered, but were not thought to impair
92 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 at 70, 38 S.Ct. 16 (1917).
93Warley v. Buchanan, 165 Ky. 559, 177 S.W. 472 (1915).
94 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 at 79, 38 S.Ct. 16 (1917).
95Jd. at 62-63. See also Carey v. City of Atlanta, 143 Ga. 192, 84 S.E. 456 (1915),
overthrowing a race restrictive ordinance of the City of Atlanta on the ground that the
restriction which the ordinance worked on the landowner's right to use or sell his land
was a taking of property without due process of law. Cf. Birmingham v. Monk, (5th
Cir. 1950) 185 F. (2d) 859, reh. den.
96 Tyler v. Harmon, 158 La. 439, 104 S. 200 (1925).
97 158 La. 439 at 454 where the court says, "Although we cannot quite reconcile our
judgment in the present case with all that is said in Buchanan v. Warley, the two cases
may be distinguished••••"
98 Tyler v. Harmon, 158 La. 439 at 448, 453-454, 104 S. 200 (1925).
99 Id. at 446.
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the reasonable exercise of the police power in the formulation of merely
"... another kind of zoning ordinance."100 While the analysis of the
Louisiana court closely followed the logic of the Plessy opinion,101 on
appeal the Supreme Court again rejected the attempted extension of the
separate but equal rule to residential zoning ordinances.102
The separate but equal rule has also been urged upon the courts as
a constitutional justification for race restrictive agreements among private parties running with the land. 103 Expressly upon the authority of
the Plessy case, the Missouri court upheld such an agreement against
the objection that it involved a wi:ongful restraint upon the power of
alienation.104 Nor was the matter clarified when the Supreme Court
decided Corrigan v. Buckley1° 15 affirming the validity of such agreements
in the District of Columbia as between private parties and without regard to their enforceability in the courts. On the other hand, other
courts refused to enforce restrictions on alienation couched in terms of
the race of the vendee, holding them to be invalid at common law.1011
The Supreme Court, recently presented with this issue, has cleared the
air of confusion, at least as to this aspect of race separation by force of
law.101

100 Id. at 458.
101 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. 1138 (1896).
102 Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 668, 47 S.Ct. 471 (1927). See also Hopkins v. City
of Richmond, 117 Va. 692, 86 S.E. 139 (1915) upholding the race restrictive zoning
ordinance of that city. The Virginia court found authority for its decision in the Plessy
separate but equal principle (117 Va. 692 at 723), in C. & 0. R.R. v. Kentucky (117 Va.
692 at 724), and in Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education (117 Va. 692 at
724). But C. & O. R. R. v. Kentucky, 179 U.S. 388, 21 S.Ct. 101 (1900) had not
involved the Fourteenth Amendment, and plaintiff in Cumming v. Richmond County
Board of Education, 175 U.S. 528, 20 S.Ct. 197 (1899) had made no issue of the requirement of separation. In a subsequent case, the United States Supreme Court overthrew
the Richmond ordinance. City of Richmond v. Dean, 281 U.S. 704, 50 S.Ct. 407 (1930).
10a See Bruce, "Racial Zoning by Private Contract," 13 VA. L. REc. (n.s.) 526
(1928); Bruce, "Racial Zoning by Private Contract," 21 ILL. L. REv. 704 (1927); MANcuM,
LEGAL STATUS OF THB NEGRO 147-156 (1940); Ming, "Racial Restrictions and the Fourteenth Amendment," 16 UNIV. Cm. L. REv. 203, 212 et seq. (1949); MoNCHow, Us:s
01' DBED RESTRICTIONS IN SUBDIVISION DBVBLOPMBNT (1928).
l04Koehler v. Rowland, 275 Mo. 573, 205 S.W. 217 (1918). Refreshingly, the
court here called a spade a spade, saying, at 585: "The discrimination against negroes has
been recognized by the courts in other matters where their presence has been objected to
for reasons similar to the reasons advanced here."
105 271 U.S. 323, 46 S.Ct. 521 (1926). Since the case arose in the District of
Columbia, it did not raise any substantial Fourteenth Amendment questions. Nor did the
pleadings make an issue of possible public action through the courts in enforcing the
restrictive agreements. The Corrigan decision is analyzed by the Court in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 at 8-9, 68 S.Ct. 836 (1948).
1 0 6 For example, Northwest Real Estate v. Serio, 156 Md. 229, 144 A. 245 (1929).
101 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. I, 68 S.Ct. 836 (1948), discussed infra p. 226.
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Another aspect of human relations in which enforced
separation of the races has been practiced under state law is the marriage institution.108 Most of the states which provide for separate
schools (and many more which do not) also place legal disabilities of
one type or another upon miscegenous matrimony. The constitutional
status of such provisions has never been presented for Supreme Court
decision. 109 State and lower federal court opinions typically have upheld them, regarding the marriage relation as traditionally subject to
the police power and finding no inherent unreasonableness in the rule
of law laid down. 110 While the Plessy doctrine has not been precisely
in point, the attitudes and traditions of thought which underlay the
nineteenth century authorities for Plessy and which led to its formulation, have been strongly operative in inHuencing the view of the
courts as to racial separation in this most intimate of personal relationships.111
The manifestations of enforced race separation discussed above and
the judicial rationalizations by which they have ordinarily been reconciled with the Fourteenth Amendment typify the position of the American Negro in the enjoyment of personal right under the law during
much of the past century.112 With the modem emphasis of the Supreme Court upon individual rights, it is not surprising that the underMarriage.

108 See 58 YALE L.J. 472 (1949); MANGUM, LEGAL STATUS OP THB NEGRO, c. 10
(1940).
109The early case of Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583, 1 S.Ct. 637 (1882) has often
been regarded as upholding such a miscegenation statute. The precise issue in that case,
however, concerned the difference in punishments imposed by law in adultery cases where
the parties practicing adultery were of different races as compared with cases in which
they were of the same race. Defendant did not raise a question as to the constitutional
validity of imposing a penalty upon persons living together who were properly married
and whose only guilt was that they were of different races.
11016 C.J.S. §541. See, for example, State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389 (1871); Scott v.
Georgia, 39 Ga. 321 (1869); Stevens v. United States, (10th Cir. 1944) 146 F. (2d) 120;
Scott v. Tutty, (C.C. Ga. 1890) 41 F. 753. In Eggers v. Olson, 104 Okla. 297, 231 P.
483 (1924) the Oklahoma miscegenation law was construed to invalidate a marriage in
Oklahoma even though it had been valid in the state in which it had taken place. To the
contrary, see Pearson v. Pearson, 51 Cal. 120 at 125 (1875). Cf. also State v. Treadaway,
126 La. 300, 52 S. 500 (1910). Of these cases, only the Gibson and Stevens opinions
considered possible Fourteenth Amendment questions.
lllBerger, ''The Supreme Court and Group Discrimination Since 1937," 49 CoL.
L. REv. 201 at 202-205 (1949). See also I MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN Dn.l!MMA 60-67
(1944) and especially c. 28, "The Basis of Social Inequality."
112 See Waite, "The Negro in the Supreme Court," 30 Mnm. L. REv. 219 (1946);
MANGUM, LEGAL STATUS OP nm NEGRO (1940). See also Watt and Orlikoff, ''The
Coming Vindication of Mr. Justice Harlan," 44 ILL. L. REv. 13 at 20 et seq. (1949);
and I MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA, Part VI, "Justice" 526 et seq. (1944).
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pinning of the structure of legalized discrimination has begun to give
way and that, with it, the legal walls separating the races have begun
to crumble.

The New Insistence Upon Equality
The shift which has recently been taking place in the approach
of the Supreme Court to the problem of enforced separation of the
races can best be epitomized by noting two new formularies which it
has employed in emphasizing the individual nature of constitutional
right. One is that such rights are personal and present.113 Another is
that "equal protection of the laws is not achieved through indiscriminate
imposition of inequalities."114 Both mean that equal protection is not
provided by dealing with groups of persons as groups and according
equal treatment to the members on some sort of general average basis.115
Yet despite this new emphasis upon the personal nature of constitutional right, there is force in Luscky's suggestion that the cases also
reveal an awareness by the Court of a national interest-quite apart
from the individual's private interest-which is served by vindication
of the rights of members of minority groups.116 The shift that has
occurred since the day when the Fourteenth Amendment was interpreted to require merely nominal rather than real equality of treatment,117 equality being conceived as "substantial equality"118 which
113 Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 at 351, 59 S.Ct. 232 (1938);
Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80 at 97, 61 S.Ct. 873 (1941); Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. l at 22, 68 S.Ct. 836 (1948); Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 at 633, 68
S.Ct. 299 (1948); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 at 635; 70 S.Ct. 848 (1950); Perez v.
Sharp, 32 Cal. (2d) 711 at 717, 198 P. (2d) 17 (1948). See also Justice Hughes' early
statement of the principle in McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 235 U.S. 151 at
161, 35 S.Ct. 69 (1914): " . . . the essence of the constitutional right is that it is a
personal one...• It is the individual who is entitled to the equal protection of the laws...."
114 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. l at 22; Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 at 635,
70 S.Ct. 848 (1940).
115 Corbin v. County School Board, (4th Cir. 1949) 177 F. (2d) 924 at 926. But
this is not to take from the states the power reasonably to classify according to criteria
material to a legitimate legislative purpose.
116 Luscky, ''Minority Rights and the Public Interest," 52 YALE L.J. l at 15-19 (1942).
Luscky draws an interesting contrast (id. at 26 et seq.) between Brown v. Mississippi, 297
U.S. 278, 56 S.Ct. 461 (1936) and Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 60 S.Ct. 472
(1940), between Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 62 S.Ct. 1252 (1942) and Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55 (1932), finding in these cases evidence of an emerging
recognition by the Court of a national interest in protection of minority rights.
117 Lehew v. Brummel, 103 Mo. 546, 15 S.W. 765 (1891); People ex rel. King v.
Gallagher, 93 N.Y. 438 (1883).
118 See 82 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 157 at 160, n. 22 (1933), where the note writer protested against the substantial equality test, saying: " ••• the only 'reasonable' inequality in
educational facilities is inequality because of the impossibility of mathematically exact
duplication."
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could exist in the face of very considerable differences in fact, has been
a fundamental one.119
The new judicial viewpoint has manifested itself in a host of decisions in a variety of fields in which state action has been challenged as
depriving members of minority groups of constitutional rights.120 In
the context of inequality in which particular cases have raised the question, enforced separation has been invalidated as to covenants restricting
the ownership of land,1 21 the provision of public education,1 22 travel
on interstate carriers,1 23 participation in the marriage relation,1 24 membership in labor unions entitled to rights under federal law,125 and the
enjoyment of public recreational facilities. 126 Let us examine some of
the more important of these decisions.
119While we speak of this shift as "having occurred,'' the law changes but slowly.
We shall show that the shift is clear, but this is not to say that occasional cases consistent
only with the older doctrine do not still come down.
120 For example, as to the right to vote, see Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 64
S.Ct. 757 (1944); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 61 S.Ct. 1031 (1941); Davis
v. Schnell, (D.C. Ala. 1949) 81 F. Supp. 872, affd. 336 U.S. 933, 69 S.Ct. 749 (1949);
and Elmore v. Rice, (D.C. S.C. 1947) 72 F. Supp. 516. As to the right to representation
of the Negro race on the panel from which the grand jury is drawn which indicts a Negro
defendant, see Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 62 S.Ct. 1159 (1942); Cassell v. Texas, 339
U.S. 282, 70 S.Ct. 629 (1950); and State v. Speller, 229 N.C. 67, 47 S.E. (2d) 537
(1948). As to the corresponding right with respect to the petit jury, see Crumb v. State,
205 Ga. 547, 54 S.E. (2d) 639 (1949) but cf. Moore v. New York, 333 U.S. 565, 68
S.Ct. 704 (1948) sustaining the New York "blue ribbon" jury system. As to freedom from
coerced confessions, see Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 60 S.Ct. 472 (1940), where
Justice Black declared that the Court has no ''higher duty'' than that of "translating into
living law" the "constitutional shield . • • inscribed for the benefit of every human being
subject to our Constitution-of whatever race, creed or persuasion." 309 U.S. 227 at 241.
See generally, Berger, "The Supreme Court and Group Discrimination Since 1937,'' 49
CoL. L. R:sv. 201 at 211 et seq. (1949).
Contrary to the general tenor of the foregoing cases, the color classification was sustained against Fifth Amendment due process objection in connection with separate Negrowhite draft quotas in World War II. United States ex rel. Lynn v. Downer, (2d Cir.
1944) 140 F. (2d) 397, cert. den. (because case had become moot) 322 U.S. 756, 64
S.Ct. 1263 (1944), reh. den. 323 U.S. 817, 65 S.Ct. 426 (1945). Nevertheless, indications are that racial segregation within the services is a disappearing institution. N.Y.
TIMES, March 19, 1951, p. 15:2 and July 27, 1951, p. 2:4.
121 Infra p. 226.
122 Infra p. 232.
12s Infra p. 228.
124 Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. (2d) 711, 198 P. (2d) 17 (1948), and comments in 62
HAnv. L. R:sv. 307 (1948) and 58 YALB L.J. 472 (1949).
121> Steele v. L. & N. R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 202, 65 S.Ct. 226 (1944); Tunstall v.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210, 65 S.Ct. 235 (1944). Cf. editorial,
"The South's Negro Labor,'' N.Y. Times, May 27, 1951, §4, p. 8:2.
126 Kem v. City Commissioners of Newton, 151 Kan. 565, 100 P. (2d) 709 (1940)
(swimming pool); Lawrence v. Hancock, (D.C. W.Va. 1948) 76 F. Supp. 1004 (swimming pool); Culver v. City of Warren, 84 Ohio App. 373, 83 N.E. (2d) 82 (1948)
(swimming pool); Law v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, (D.C. Md. 1948) 78 F.
Supp. 346 (golf course); Lopez v. Seccombe, (D.C. Cal. 1944) 71 F. Supp. 769 (public
bathhouse, swimming pool, playground and park facilities). Contra: Boyer v. Garrett, (4th
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Real Estate. In view of the long-standing skepticism of the Supreme Court as to the application of the separate but equal rule to the
ownership or occupancy of real estate,1 27 it is not surprising that the
trend to limit the power of the state to classify its citizens on the basis
of race or color has manifested itself clearly in this area. Although the
Supreme Court in a series of decisions had already made clear that
states or municipalities might not by restrictive ordinances exclude persons from the ownership or occupancy of land by reason of race, it had
seemed that the same result might be achieved by "private" restrictive
covenants, negotiated by neighboring property holders and made to run
with the land. If such a device were available, saved from Fourteenth
Amendment condemnation because of the "private" genesis of the arrangement, it was evident that much of the force of the decisions against
restrictive ordinances would be lost. The issue was presented to the
Supreme Court in two cases originating in Missouri and Michigan respectively. The state supreme court in each case had given judgment
for the plaintiff seeking enforcment of the restrictive covenant,128 and
defendant brought certiorari. Taking care to distinguish its own earlier
decision in Corrigan v. Buckley1 29 where no question had been raised as
to judicial enforcement of the restrictive private agreement challenged,130 the Court found the present cases to turn upon whether such
enforcement of the restrictive agreement was properly to be regarded
as state action under the Fourteenth Amendment, and, if so, whether
this action denied to defendants the equal protection of the laws.181
Cir. 1950) 183 F. (2d) 582 (separation upheld as to activities on public playground where
equal facilities are available). Certiorari was denied because application was not made
within prescribed time, 340 U.S. 912, 71 S.Ct. 203 (1951). See also Rice v. Arnold, 340
U.S. 848, 71 S.Ct. 77 (1950) directing the Supreme Court of Florida to reconsider, in
the light of Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 70 S.Ct. 848 (1950) and McLaurin v.
Oklahoma, 339 U.S. 637, 70 S.Ct. 851 (1950), a· decision upholding the application of
the separate but equal rule to limit the use of a public golf course by Negroes to one day
each week, white patrons then being excluded. The original Florida decision is found in
45 s. (2d) 195 (1950).
121Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 38 S.Ct. 16 (1917).
128 Kraemer v. Shelley, 355 Mo. 814, 198 S.W. (2d) 679 (1946) and Sipes v.
McGhee, 316 Mich. 614, 25 N.W. (2d) 638 (1947).
120 271 U.S. 323, 46 S.Ct. 521 (1926).
1s0 Shelley v. Kraemer, McGhee v. Sipes, 334 U.S. 1 at 8-9, 13-14, 68 S.Ct. 836
(1948). The Court found the force of the Corrigan decision only to the effect that " •••
the restrictive agreement standing alone cannot be regarded as violative of any rights guar•
anteed to petitioners by the Fourteenth Amendment. So long as the purposes of those
agreements are effectuated by voluntary adherence to their terms, it would appear clear
that there has been no action by the State and the provisions of the Amendment have not
been violated." Id. at 13.
1s1 Id. at 13-14.
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Since Strauder v. West Virginia,1 82 official action of a judicial officer of
the state, whether or not pursuant to a statute, had been recognized as
state action.183 To lend judicial sanction for enforcement of private
arrangements discriminating against individuals by reason of race, the
Court was clear would constitute a denial of equal protection184 in contravention of the basic policy of the Fourteenth Amendment.135 Thus,
the issue left suspended by Corrigan v. Buckley1 86 was directly an1a2 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
188 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334

.
U.S. 1 at 14-18, 68 S.Ct. 836 (1948). An annotation
entitled "Racial Restrictions in Deeds" follows the case at 3 A.L.R. (2d) 446 (1948).
While definition of the extremes of "state" or "private" action is attended with no great
difficulty, classification of intermediate cases may raise vexing problems. Stuyvessant Town
was a privately-owned and operated housing development which enjoyed a certain public
sponsorship, having been granted partial tax exemption and the power of eminent domain.
Its discrimination among tenants upon the basis of race was held not to constitute state
action. Dorsey v. Stuyvessant Town Corp., 74 N.Y.S. (2d) 220 (1947), affd. 299 N.Y.
512, 87 N.E. (2d) 541 (1949) and cert. den. 339 U.S. 981, 70 S.Ct. 1019 (1950). But
in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 66 S.Ct. 276 (1946) the conduct of those acting
upon behalf of the administration of a company-owned town, challenged as infrlnging
freedom of religion, was held to be state action. See 45 MICH. L. REv. 733 at 744-746
(1947); 61 HAnv. L. REv. 344 (1948) and 28 TEX:. L. REv. 976 (1950). In Norris v.
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, (D.C. Md. 1948) 78 F. Supp. 451, racial discrimination as to the admission of students by a privately-owned and managed art school which
received a public subsidy, in return for which certain public officers made tuition-free
appointments to the student body, was held not to constitute state action. On the other
hand, in Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, (D.C. Md. 1944)- 54 F. Supp. 514, reversed
(4th Cir. 1945) 149 F. (2d) 212, cert. den. 326 U.S. 721, 66 S.Ct. 26 (1945), the result
was otherwise. Here the administration of a library training school was in the hands oE
private trustees, and the library had originated in a private gift. Title and financial administration of the property, however, were in the city which also lent financial support to the
institution. The district court held consistently with the Norris case supra that racial discrimination as to the admission of students by the private trustees did not constitute state
action, but this holding was reversed by the court of appeals, this court finding the Fourteenth Amendment applicable to the library as, in effect, "• •• an instrumentality of the
State of Maryland." 149 F. (2d) at 219. See 62 HAnv. L. REv. 126 (1948).
The implications of a rigorous application of the Shelley principle that the Fourteenth
Amendment precludes any state action to aid or abet private racial discriminations are far.
reaching. Cf. Valle v. Stengel, (3d Cir. 1949) 176 F. (2d) 697 and see Ming, "The
Restrictive Covenant Cases," 16 Umv. Cm. L. REv. 203 at 234 (1949). Whether in
future cases the Court will give the principle absolute application or whether there is yet
room to balance confficting civil and property rights which may be at stake remains to be
determined. See 48 Cot. L. REv. 1241 at 1245 (1948).
184 " ••• these are cases in which the States have made available to private ••• individuals the full coercive power of government to deny to petitioners, on the grounds of
race or color, the enjoyment of property rights in premises which petitioners are willing
and financially able to acquire and which the grantors are willing to sell." Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 at 19, 68 S.Ct. 836 (1948).
185 "Whatever else the framers sought to achieve, it is clear that the matter of primary
concern was the establishment of equality in the enjoyment of basic civil and political rights
and the preservation of those rights from discriminatory action on the part of the States
based on considerations of race or color." 334 U.S. 1 at 23. The decision was unanimous
as to the justices participating although Justices Reed, Jackson, and Rutledge took no part
in consideration or decision of the cases.
1sa 271 U.S. 323, 46 S.Ct. 521 (1926).
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swered: there is no room under the Fourteenth Amendment for state
action of any sort to enforce separation of the races as to ownership or
occupancy of real estate.137
Interstate Passenger Transportation. The judicial retreat from approval of state-sponsored separation of the races is also evident in the
field of interstate transportation. Despite the precedent of the Plessy
decision, the probability of such a retreat was foreshadowed as early
as the McCabe case in which Chief Justice Hughes emphasized the
personal nature of constitutional right and rejected the theory of the
trial court that the legislature might consider the limited demand for
first-class travel accommodations by colored passengers in determining
whether it was necessary to provide this class of facilities for such colored passengers as might request them.138 In 1941 a situation very
similar to that of the 1910 Chiles case139 again came before the bar
of the high court. Congressman Mitchell of Illinois, travelling from
Chicago to Hot Springs, Ark., was refused Pullman space from Memphis to Hot Springs although unassigned space was available. Despite his first-class ticket, he was obliged to travel the latter part of his
137 Shelley v. Kraemer is noted in 48 CoL. L. RBv. 1241 (1948); 61 H.mv. L. RBv.
1450 (1948); 27 N.C.L. RBv. 224 (1949); 2 VAND. L. RBv. 119 (1948). See also City
of .Birmingham v. Monk, (5th Cir. 1950) 185 F. (2d) 859, rehearing den., affirming
(D.C. Ala. 1949) 87 F. Supp. 538 invalidating a race restrictive zoning ordinance of the
city of Birmingham, noted in 27 N.D. L. RBv. 344 (1951).
The same day that the Court decided Shelley v. Kraemer, it also decided two cases
brought up from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in which judgments
had been affirmed below for plaintiffs seeking to enforce race restrictive covenants within
the District. Reversing, the Supreme Court found that the Civil Rights Acts (supra note 90)
were determinative of the issue, but added that even in the absence of such statutes, " •••
the public policy of the United States as manifested in the Constitution, treaties, federal
statutes, and applicable legal precedents • • ." would dictate a refusal by the Court to give
effect to plaintiff's petitions. Hurd v. Hodge, Urciolo v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 at 34-35,
68 S.Ct. 847 (1948).
Note should also be taken of recent cases challenging the alien land laws of several
of the western states. In Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 68 S.Ct. 269 (1948) certain
disadvantageous presumptions applicable to aliens subject to the California alien land law
were held to deny to aliens in California the equal protection of the laws. The total ground
of the holding is not clear. The Court does not £nd race an invalid principle of classi£cation, and conffict of the California law with the federal civil rights legislation entitling all
citizens to buy and hold real property is mentioned. 332 U.S. 633 at 640, 647. In a recent
Oregon case, the supreme court of that state has held expressly that color, race and creed
are not constitutionally acceptable classificatory criteria as to legislation dealing with land
ownership. Kenji Namba v. McCourt, 185 Ore. 579, 204 P. (2d) 569 (1949). The California appellate court, in another recent case, added the interesting suggestion that the
use of such a principle of classification is invalid not only because of Fourteenth Amendment limitations but also because of the force of the United Nations Charter, incorporated,
as the Court held, into the law of the land through the treaty power. Sei Fujii v. State,
(D.C. App. Cal. 1950) 217 P. (2d) 481, reh. den. 218 P. (2d) 595.
13s McCabe v. A.T. & S.F. R. Co., 235 U.S. 151 at 161, 35 S.Ct. 69 (1914).
139 Chiles v. C. & 0. R.R. Co., 218 U.S. 71, 30 S.Ct. 667 (1910).
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journey in a coach.140 Incensed at the treatment he had received, Mitchell filed a complaint with the Interstate Commerce Commission, but
this was dismissed on the ground that the facilities available to colored patrons were not inadequate in the light of the existing demand
and the requirements of the Arkansas separate coach law.141 The Supreme Court reversed the Commission. Although it was careful to
point out that the decision was governed by the statutory provisions of
the Interstate Commerce Act and that the issue was not as to segregation but rather as to equality of treatment,1 42 the insistence of the Court
that a comparatively small volume of traffic cannot justify denial of the
fundamental right of equality1 43 seemed to leave little room for economically practicable separation in many phases of interstate transportation.
Racial separation of passengers on interstate carriers was again before the Court in 1946 in the case of Morgan v. Virginia. 144 Here was
at issue a statute of the State of Virginia1415 requiring separation of white
and Negro patrons on all passenger motor carriers, whether interstate
or intrastate, so that persons of different races would not occupy contiguous seats at the same time. Refusal to comply with the requirement
of separation by the carrier was made a misdemeanor.146 Defendant, a
140Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80 at 89, 61 S.Ct. 873 (1941), noted IO GBo.
WAsH. L. REv. 229 (1941); 39 Mica. L. REv. 1414 (1941). The railroad was accus•
tomed to carry Negro passengers wishing first class accommodations in private compart·
ments at no extra charge, and Mitchell had made application for a compartment, The case
arose only because all compartments were filled and empty Pullman space was yet available.
Mitchell alleged that the coach to which he was obliged to move was "filthy and foul
smelling" (313 U.S. at 90-91), but the Interstate Commerce Commission, on subsequent
investigation, found that the old coach had been replaced by clean, modern and air-condi·
tioned equipment. Mitchell v. Chicago R.I. and P.R. Co., 229 I.C.C. 703 at 707 (1938),
See Luscky, ''Minority Rights and the Public Interest," 52 YALE L.J. 1 at 31 (1942).
141 Mitchell v. Chicago, R.I. and P.R. Co., 229 I.C.C. 703 at 707 (1938). The
Commission concluded: "The present coach properly takes care of colored second-class
passengers, and the drawing rooms and compartments in the sleeper provide proper Pullman
accommodations for colored first-class passengers, but there are no dining car nor observation•
parlor car accommodations for the latter, and they cannot lawfully range through the train."
On these findings, the Commission upheld the company's regulations.
Interestingly enough, when Mitchell appealed to the courts, the United States, through
the Department of Justice, intervened in his behalf and against the Commission, seeking
to establish (I) that the Arkansas Separate Coach Act should have no application to persons
traveling in interstate commerce, and (2) that the mere fact that the number of colored
passengers is small does not justify " ••• occasional discrimination against them because of
their race." Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80 at 92, 61 S.Ct. 873 (1941).
142 313 U.S. 80 at 94, 61 S.Ct. 873 (1941).
143 Id. at 97.
144 328 U.S. 373, 66 S.Ct. 1050 (1946), noted 46 CoL. L. RBv. 853 (1946); 45 MxcH.
L. REv. 209 (1946); 25 TBX. L. Rllv. 89 (1946); 95 Umv. PA. L. REv. 78 (1946). The
facts here stated are taken from the opinion of the Court.
14l5Virginia Code of 1942, §§4097z to 4097dd.
146 Id., §§4097z, 4097bb.
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Negro en route from Virginia to Maryland, was arrested and convicted
for such a refusal, and her conviction was affirmed by the Virginia
Court of Appeals.147 Passing over any equal protection questions (as it
has typically done in cases involving racial separation on interstate carriers since Hall 11. DeCuir in 1877148 ), the Supreme Court reversed,
disposing of the question by a routine constitutional interpretation of
the commerce power. "[S]eating arrangements for the different races in
interstate motor travel," said the Court, "require a single, uniform rule
to promote and protect national travel."149 The Virginia separation law
was overthrown as a burden. upon interstate commerce.150 Dissenting
sharply, Justice Burton pointed out that the logic of the majority would
operate as well to invalidate state statutes prohibiting race separation
affecting interstate commerce, so leaving the matter entirely to the uncontrolled discretion of the carriers with a possibly greater departure
from a nationally uniform pattern (absent controlling federal legislation) than had previously existed.151
Justice Burton's concern that the logic of the Morgan decision
tended to free interstate carriers completely from state law concerning
147 Morgan v. Virginia, 184 Va. 24, 34 S.E. (2d) 491 (1945).
148 95 U.S. 485 (1877). In McCabe v. A.T. and S.F. R., 235 U.S. 151, 35 S.Ct.
69 (1914) the equal protection clause was noted and discussed but did not provide the
ground of the holding. Supra note 68.
149Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 at 386, 66 S.Cf. 1050 (1946).
150 328 U.S. 373 at 377, 386. Justice Frankfurter concurred in the judgment that a
"crazy-quilt" of state laws would unreasonably burden interstate commerce, but denied that
this left as a sole alternative a uniform national rule. He raised the question whether
Congress might not devise a national policy recognizing the different interests of different
regions. Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 at 388-389, 66 S.Ct. 1050 (1946). The
Morgan case was distinguished in the subsequent decision of the North Carolina court in
Pridgen v. Carolina Coach Co., 229 N.C. 46, 47 S.E. (2d) 609 (1948) upholding as
zeasonable the race separation rules of an interstate highway carrier, such rules happening
to be consistent with the race separation statutes of North Carolina. The Court cited Hall
v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1877); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. 1138 (1896);
and Chiles v. C. & 0. R.R. Co., 218 U.S. 71, 30 S.Ct. 667 (1910). See also Whiteside
v. Southern Bus Lines, (6th Cir. 1949) 177 F. (2d) 949 and 4 RUTGERS L. REv. 719
(1950).
151 Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 389 at 390-391, 66 S.Ct. 1050 (1946). Justice
Burton further questioned whether appellant had succeeded in demonstrating sufficiently
the fact of a burden upon interstate commerce to warrant the Court in overthrowing a
statute honored by many years of experience.
Just a year later, the Court was confronted with a case which was a natural complement to the Morgan case. Here an interstate (technically foreign) carrier, operating between
a point in Michigan and a Canadian island but engaged in what was in fact primarily local
transportation, challenged as a burden upon its commerce the applicatioµ. to it of the Michigan civil rights statute prohibiting race separation. Supra note 8. The Court held that
the essentially local nature of the commerce involved warranted the application of the
statute, but noted also that both federal policy and also Canadian policy are opposed to
race discrimination. Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28 at 37, 68 S.Ct. 358
(1948).
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race separation of passengers and to put the matter completely in the
independent discretion of the carriers themselves was brought to test
in the Henderson case decided in June 1950.152 In May 1942, Henderson, a Negro, had been a passenger on a Southern Railway train.
At that time it was the practice of the railroad to serve Negro patrons of
its dining cars only at the two tables at the end of the car next to the
kitchen.153 If other tables became filled, however, white patrons were permitted to occupy these places, and no colored patrons would be seated in
the diner until the two end tables had been vacated. Upon the calling of
the evening meal, Henderson presented himself at the diner, but found
that white customers had occupied some-though not all--of the seats
at each of the two end tables. Under these circumstances the steward
refused to seat Henderson,1 54 but promised to notify him at his Pullman seat when space was available. No word was sent, however, and
although he returned several times during the course of the evening
sitting, he did not succeed in obtaining service before the diner was
finally detached from the train about nine o'clock. Henderson filed a
complaint with the Interstate Commerce Commission charging the carrier with violation of the anti-discrimination provisions of the Interstate
Commerce Act:1 55 and seeking an order to require it to cease and desist
from certain named practices, to provide equal and just dining car facilities in the future, and to discontinue the use of race separation curtains around tables reserved for Negroes. 156 The case reached the Supreme Court after the carrier had revised its rules to reserve 40 seats
unconditionally for white patrons and four seats unconditionally for
Negroes, this allocation of space being said to be based upon past experience as to the relative number of white and Negro customers.157
152 Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816, 70 S.Ct. 843 (1950), reh. den. 340
U.S. 486, 71 S.Ct. 13 (1950). The facts stated are taken from the opinion of the Court.
153 Under the carrier's regulations in force at the time, Negro patrons were either to
be served at different times than whites, or, if served simultaneously, the two end tables
were to be closed off from the remainder of the car by "race separation curtains" to provide
a separate dining compartment. 339 U.S. 816 at 819, n. 2.
1114 Pursuant to company rules applicable when available space for Negroes had been
occupied by white persons, the steward offered to serve Henderson at his Pullman seat at
no extra cost, but Henderson declined this service. Id. at 819-820.
11!5 54 Stat. L. 902 (1940), 49 U.S.C. (1946) §3(1), originally enacted as 24 Stat.
L. 379.
156 Henderson v. Southern Ry. Co., 258 I.C.C. 413 (1944); Henderson v. United
States, 339 U.S. 816 at 820, n. 3, 70 S.Ct. 843 (1950).
157 In the original proceedings before the Commission it was found that Henderson
had been subjected to undue and unreasonable prejudice and disadvantage, but the Commission concluded this was but a casual incident and declined to enter any order as to the
future. Henderson v. Southern Ry. Co., 258 I.C.C. 413 at 419 (1944). On appeal to the
courts, a three-judge district court held the evidence showed the railroad guilty of a con-
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Finding the issue "largely controlled"158 by the Mitchell case,1 59 the
Cou:rt overthrew the revised rules as violative of the Interstate Commerce Act. "The right to be free from unreasonable discriminations
belongs, under §3(1), to each particular person. . . . The denial of
dining service to any such passenger by the rules before us subjects him
to a prohibited disadvantage."160 While the case turned upon an interpretation of the statutory language of the Interstate Commerce Act, the
Court's affirmation of the personal nature of the right to equality under
the act is identical with the Shelley v. Kraemer 61 interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Query then: How far can Henderson be extended without colliding with Plessy? What significance would Henderson have if a new challenge were brought to the Supreme Court, on
the strength of the equal protection clause, of state-enforced separation
of the races in intrastate commerce, the Plessy v. Ferguson162 situation?
Public Education. Perhaps the most portentous development in
the application of the separate but equal rule has been in the field of
public education. This significance springs from the fact that the
formulary was largely evolved from early state court decisions upholding the validity of separate public schools, and from the further fact
that recent decisions qualifying the power of the state to segregate in
public education have been square applications of the equal protection clause without support of other constitutional or statutory authortinning practice violative of the act and remanded to the Commission for further proceed·
ings. Henderson v. United States, (D.C. Md. 1945) 63 F. Supp. 906. The railroad then
modified its rules to reserve unconditionally four seats for its colored patrons and 40 seats
for white patrons, this allotment being based upon experience. These rules were accepted
by the full commission. Henderson v. Southern Ry. Co., 269 I.C.C. 73 (1947) and sustained on appeal by the district court. Henderson v. I.C.C., (D.C. Md. 1948) 80 F. Supp.
32 at 39.
158 Henderson
150 Mitchell v.

v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 at 823, 70 S.Ct. 843 (1950).
United States, 313 U.S. 80, 61 S.Ct. 873 (1941).
160 Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 at 824, 70 S.Ct. 843 (1950). The
Court brought the facts of the case within the principle stated thus: "Under the rules, only
four Negro passengers may be served at one time and then only at the table reserved for
Negroes. Other Negroes who present themselves are compelled to await a vacancy at that
table, although there may be many vacancies elsewhere in the diner. The railroad thus
refuses to extend to those passengers the use of its existing and unoccupied facilities. The
rules impose a like deprivation upon white passengers whenever more than 40 of them
seek to be served at the same time and the table reserved for Negroes is vacant." Id. at
824-825. The decision of the Court was implemented by reopening and reversal of the
prior proceedings before the Interstate Commerce Commission and the issuance by that
agency of an order directing the carrier thereafter not. to refuse dining car service to any
person because of race when a dining car with an unoccupied seat or seats is available.
Henderson v. Southern Ry. Co., 279 I.C.C. 233 (1950).
1s1334 U.S. 1 at 22, 68 S.Ct. 836 (1948).
1a2 163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. 1138 (1896).
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ity. Thus, it is certainly arguable that these cases have shaken the
foundation of the Plessy doctrine. Three observations with regard
to these recent separate education cases may be made at the outset.
First, they have typically been in the field of higher education; second,
they have not overthrown the separate but equal principle; but third,
they have applied the principle so rigorously to require absolute rather
than merely substantial equality of treatment that the remaining scope
for enforced race separation in public education is uncertain.
While the precise meaning of equality of treatment is inherently
difficult of definition, recent decisions emphasize that the term has an
objective content and give some ground to believe that it will hereafter
be construed to have subjective content as well. The Court went far
toward making this clear in the leading case of Missouri ex rel. Gaines
v. Canada, decided in 1938.163 Under the constitution and laws of
the state, the University of Missouri accepted no applications from
Negro students, their education being provided for at a separate institution, Lincoln University. Although Lincoln did not offer as complete
a program in as many fields as did the State University, its Board of
Curators was empowered to open new schools or departments from
time to time as they deemed advisable, and further, pending the opening of such departments, they were empowered to provide for the attendance of Negro residents of Missouri at the university of any adjacent state to take any course of study provided for at the University of
Missouri and not offered at Lincoln, the state to pay reasonable tuition
costs for such attendance.164 Without regard for this statutory arrangement, Lloyd Gaines, a Negro, filed application for admission to the
Law School of the University of Missouri. This application was rejected because of Gaines' race, and he was advised to make arrangements for his legal education through the Curators of Lincoln University. He then applied to the courts for mandamus to compel the
University of Missouri to accept his application for admission. The
Missouri courts found that the Lincoln University Act assured Gaines
of full equality of treatment and rejected his petition.165 The Supreme
Court, in an 8-1 decision, reversed.166 It set aside the question of the
168 305 U.S. 337, 59 S.Ct. 232 (1938), noted 24 CoRN. L.Q. 419 (1939); 37 MxCIJ.
L. RBv. 649 (1939); 6 Umv. Cm. L. RBv. 301 (1939); 87 Umv. PA. L. RBv. 478
(1939). The facts here stated are taken from the opinion of the court. For reference to
traditional criteria of equality in public education, see note 86 supra.
164 Mo. Rev. Stat. (1929) §9622.
.
165 State ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 342 Mo. 121, 113 S.W. (2d) 783 (1938).
166Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 59 S.Ct. 232 (1938).
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relative advantages of study at the University of Missouri and the
state universities of the adjoining states which Gaines might have attended under the Lincoln University Act, and held that laws requiring
separation must be tested by the equality of privileges given the separated groups within the state.167 On this basis, inequality was manifest
since no provision existed within Missouri for legal education of
Negroes. 108 It must be conceded that the line drawn by the Court was
in a sense a fine one. Justice McReynolds, in a pointed dissent, argued
that the Court was overthrowing the state's policy of separation under
circumstances in which the fact of inequality was by no means "clear
and unrnistakable."169 Surely he was right in sensing that the Court
was shifting to a new and more exacting standard of equality than had
previously been employed.110
167 Id. at 349. See 12 AM. JUR. §475 discussing the proposition that equal protection
of the laws must be given within the jurisdiction of the state and cannot be afforded by
requiring a resident to leave the state in order to obtain the equality to which he is entitled. Cf. 13 Mo. L. REv. 286 at 293-298 (1948) as to validity of proposed regional
schools of higher education to be operated jointly by several states.
168 Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 at 346, 59 S.Ct. 232 (1938).
169 Id. at 353, citing Justice Harlan's opinion for the Court in Cumming v. Richmond
County Board of Education, 175 U.S. 528 at 545, 20 S.Ct. 197 (1899).
170 But the Court did not reject separation per se, for its conclusion was " ••• petitioner was entitled to be admitted to the law school of the state University in the absence
of other and proper provision for his legal training within the State." Missouri ex rel.
Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 at 352, 59 S.Ct. 232 (1938) (italics supplied). In Sipuel
v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631, 68 S.Ct. 299 (1948) the Supreme Court upheld the
right of petitioner, a Negro, to a public legal education so long as the state university
afforded such a privilege to white residents. But when the state improvised a colored law
school on less than three weeks notice, the Court found no violation of the decree. Fisher
"·· Hurst, 333 U.S. 147, 68 S.Ct. 389 (1948). But cf. Justice Rutledge's vigorous dissent
to the latter holding quoted infra in note 176. See also a series of recent Florida cases
requiring the state to afford to Negro residents certain 5Pecialized training available to white
residents at the state university, but permitting this to be done at a series of new schools
to be attached to the existing Negro agricultural college. State ex rel. Hawkins v. Bd. of
Control, (Fla. 1950) 47 S. (2d) 608 (college of law); State ex rel. Lewis v. Bd. of Control, (Fla. 1950) 47 S. (2d) 617 (college of law); State ex rel. Maxey v. Bd. of Control,
(Fla. 1950) 47 S. (2d) 618 (college of chemical engineering); State ex rel. Boyd v. Bd.
of Control, (Fla. 1950) 47 S. (2d) 619 (school of pharmacy); and State ex rel. Finley
v. Bd. of Control, (Fla. 1950) 47 S. (2d) 620 (graduate school of agriculture). Cf.
Wrighten v. Bd. of Trustees of U. of S.C., (D.C. S.C. 1947) 72 F. Supp. 948, holding up
mandamus for admission of Negro law student to the University of South Carolina until
the start of the next regular semester, the state having authority to discharge its duty toward
Negro a5Pirants for a legal education through the medium of a separate Negro institution
" ..• on a substantial parity in all reSPects with .•. the University Law School••••"
Id. at 953; Butler v. Wilemon, (D.C. Tex. 1949) 86 F. Supp. 397; Carter v. School
Board, (4th Cir. 1950) 182 F. (2d) 531; Pitts v. Bd. of Trustees, (D.C. Ark. 1949) 84
F. Supp. 975.
But other cases have been more rigorous in the application of the separate but equal
rule, under the stimulus of the Gaines judgment, and have required an end to separation
where there was no imminent pr05Pect of achieving equality. See Johnson v. Board of
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In June 1950, the Supreme Court took two long steps further in
raising the constitutional standard of equality in separate public education. In the celebrated case of Sweatt v. Painter- 71 the criteria by which
the objective equivalence of separate law schools might be appraised
were extensively argued before the Court. Sweatt, a Negro, had applied for admission to the University of Texas Law School on February 26, 1946 but was denied admission solely because of his race. At
the time of his application, the school to which he had applied was the
only state-supported law school. Nevertheless, when Sweatt had recourse to the .courts to seek a mandamus to compel his admission, the
state dauntlessly invoked the separate but equal principle. The trial
court accepted this version of the state's duty and allowed it six months
to provide substantially equal facilities for Sweatt's education. At the
expiration of this period, the authorized officials had adopted an order
calling for the opening of a separate law school for Negroes in February 1947, and, accordingly, the petition for mandamus was dismissed.
On appeal, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals remanded the case for
determination of the equality of the facilities at the new school as compared with the University of Texas. After a hearing on this matter, the
trial court found that the new school offered " ... privileges, advantages,
and opportunities for the study of law substantially equivalent to those
offered ... at the University of Texas."172 This judgment was affirmed
by the Court of Civil Appeals/ 73 and the Texas Supreme Court
denied review. Speaking through the Chief Justice, a unanimous
United States Supreme Court reversed, the issue being determined
by the ineguality of the white and colored institutions. Said the Court:
Trustees of U. of Kentucky, (D.C. Ky. 1949) 83 F. Supp. 707; McCready v. Byrd, (Md.
1950) 73 A. (2d) 8; Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, (4th Cir. 1945) 149 F. (2d).212,
reversing (D.C. Md. 1944) 54 F. Supp. 514, cert. den. 326 U.S. 721, 66 S.Ct. 26 (1945).
Cf. Norris v. Mayor of Baltimore, (D.C. Md. 1948) 78 F. Supp. 451.
111 339 U.S. 629, 70 S.Ct. 848 (1950), reh. den. 340 U.S. 846, 71 S.Ct. 13 (1950).
The facts of the case are taken from the opinion of the Court. The case was notable not
only for the decision but also for the unusual Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
filed on behalf of the "Committee of Law Teachers Against Segregation in Legal Education," containing the product of valuable researches upon the origin and intention of the
equal protection clause. (The Committee itself was composed of 187 distinguished scholars
representative of the faculties of most eminent American law schools.) This brief is reprinted in full in 34 MmN. L. REv. 289 et seq. (1950).
Law review comment on the Sweatt case and on the McLaurin case discussed below
is referred to in note 10 supra.
172 Quoted in Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 at 632. For a further summary of the
position of Texas in the case, see Arthur Krock, "The Segregation Issue as Stated by
Texas," N.Y. TxMEs, April 18, 1950, p. 30:5.
173 Sweatt v. Painter, (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) 210 S.W. (2d) 442.
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"Whether the University of Texas Law School is compared
with the original or the new law school for Negroes,1 74 we cannot
find substantial equality in the educational opportunities offered
white and Negro students by the State. In terms of number of
faculty, variety of courses and opportunity for specialization, size
of student body, scope of the library, availability of law review
and similar activities, the University of Texas Law School is
superior. What is more important, the University of Texas Law
School possesses to a far greater degree those qualities which are
incapable of objective measurement but which make for greatness
in a law school. Such qualities, to name but a few, include reputation of the faculty, experience of the administration, position and
inHuence of the alumni, standing in the community, traditions and
prestige. It is difficult to believe that one who had a free choice
between these law schools would consider the question close."1711
The Court concluded that petitioner's constitutional right to a legal education equivalent to. that offered to students of other races could not be
saved to him in a separate law school as offered by the state and held
that the equal protection clause required that he be admitted to the
University of Texas.176
The criteria employed by the Supreme Court in the Sweatt case to
test the equivalence of educational facilities available to white and Negro
students and the Court's readiness to overthrow the finding of the trial
court, already affirmed below, as to such equivalence, indicate that the
requirement of equality under the separate but equal formula is hereafter to be construed as a requirement of real equality in fact. Certainly
in the field of public higher education, the Sweatt decision has made
174 The Negro school was initially organized at Austin, but during the course of the
proceedings was removed to Houston.
175 Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 632 at 633-634, 70 S.Ct. 848 (1950).
176 339 U.S. 632 at 636. The Court's decision was strongly reminiscent of Justice
Rutledge's dissent in the second Sipuel (sub nom. Fisher) case in which he had declared:
"[The original decision] ••. plainly meant, to me at any rate, that Oklahoma should end
the discrimination practiced against petitioner at once, not at some later time, near or
remote. It also meant that this should be done, if not by excluding all students, then by
affording petitioner the advantages of a legal education equal to those afforded to white
students. And in my comprehension the equality required was equality in fact, not in legal
fiction.
"Obviously no separate law school could be established elsewhere over-night capable
of giving petitioner a legal education equal to that afforded by the state's long established
and well-known state university law school. Nor could the necessary time be taken to
create such facilities, while continuing to deny them to petitioner, without incurring the
delay which would continue the discrimination our mandate required to end at once."
Fisher v. Hurst, 333 U.S. 147 at 151-152, 68 S.Ct. 389 (1948).
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clear that enforced separation is invalidated by any clear inequality and
that the Court is prepared to examine for itself any conclusion below
as to this question. Nevertheless, it remains to be said that the Court
expressly refrained from reexamining the validity of the separate but
equal doctrine,177 and hence the Sweatt decision does not stand for invalidation of race separation per se 'and by force of law.
A second separate education decision178 handed down the same day
as the decision in the Sweatt case throws additional light upon the
Court's present conception of equality of treatment in public education.
By resort to the courts, one McLaurin, a Negro, had succeeded in obtaining admission to the University of Oklahoma to carry on a program of graduate study looking toward a doctor's degree in education.
The legislature, in recognition of the Supreme Court decisions in the
Gaines1 79 and Sipuel180 cases and the interpretation put upon them by
the district court in considering McLaurin's petition,1 81 then had repealed the former separate education acts but had re-enacted them with
a saving proviso. This proviso entitled colored students to admission
to white schools of higher education operated by the state when they
wished to pursue programs not offered at separate colored institutions,
and subject to the condition that instruction at the white schools be
"... upon a segregated basis."182 Under this statute, McLaurin was
assigned a special classroom seat in a row reserved for colored students,
a special study table in the library, and a special table in the cafeteria.183
Challenging these distinctions as a denial of equal protection of the laws,
111 Sweatt

v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 at 636, 70 S.Ct. 848 (1950).
v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 70 S.Ct. 851 (1950). The
facts here stated are taken from the opinion of the Court. For law review comment, see
note 10 supra.
179 Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 59 S.Ct. 232 (1938).
1so Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631, 68 S:Ct. 299 (1948).
181 McLaurin v. Oklahoma Board of Regents, (D.C. Okla. 1948) 87 F. Supp. 526.
182 Okla. Stat. Ann., tit. 70, §§455, 456, 457 (1950); Session Laws of Okla., 1949
(Eagin) at 608-609, c. 15, §§1, 2, and 3.
<
183 Initially, " ••• he was required to sit apart at a designated desk in an anteroom
adjoining the classroom; to sit at a designated desk on the mezzanine floor of the library,
but not to use the desks in the regular reading room; and to sit at a designated table and
to eat at a different time from the other students in the school cafeteria." McLaurin v.
Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 at 640, 70 S.Ct. 851 (1950). The district court
refused McLaurin's motion to enjoin these practices [McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents,
(D.C. Okla. 1949) 87 F. Supp. 528], and the case came on to the Supreme Court on his
appeal. While the matter was pending in the Supreme Court, the harshness of the separation was modified as indicated in the text above. McLaurin v. Oklahoma Bd. of Regents,
339 U.S. 637 at 640, 70 S.Ct. 851 (1950).
11s McLaurin
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McLaurin brought his case to the Supreme Court. Construing the issue
of the case to be"... whether a state may, after admitting a student to
graduate instruction in its state university, afford him different treatment from other students solely because of his race ..."184 the Court
held in the negative.185
Considering the Gaines, Sweatt, and McLaurin cases together, it is
clear that the Court has moved far in the direction of requiring actual,
rather than mere nominal (or even "substantial"186 ), equality of opportunity in public higher education. Indeed, what was the nature of the
inequality to which the Court objected in the Gaines and McLaurin
cases? Was there an objective differential in the educational opportunity made available by the state to the petitioner as compared with that
available to white residents? Certainly in terms of quality and scope
of instruction and of educational facilities and equipment, petitioners
were at no disadvantage. Gaines might have attended, with state support, one of the law schools provided' for white students in an adjacent
state. It was not argued or shown that such attendance would have
been less convenient to him than attendance at the state university,
and the educational opportunities would no doubt have been on a substantial par with those at Missouri.187 As for McLaurin, he was admitted to the regularly constituted state university; but in his case
the court found that the ban imposed by the school upon his com184 339 U.S. 637 at 638.
185 Speaking through the Chief Justice, the Court said: "Such restrictions impair and
inhibit his ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn his profession. . • • There is a vast difference-a Constitutional difference-between restrictions imposed by the state which prohibit the intellectual
commingling of students, and the refusal of individuals to commingle where the state
presents no such bar. • . • [T]he conditions under which this appellant is required to receive
his education deprive him of his personal and present right to the equal protection of the
laws. . . • [U]nder these circumstances the Fourteenth Amendment precludes differences
in treatment by the state based upon race." McLaurin v. Oklahoma Bd. of Regents, 339
U.S. 637 at 641-642, 70 S.Ct. 851 (1950).
186 In both the Gaines case, 305 U.S. 337 at 351, 59 S.Ct. 232 (1938) and the
Sweatt case, 339 U.S. 629 at 633, 70 S.Ct. 848 (1950), the Court still uses the phrase,
"substantial equality." But it nowhere appears in the McLaurin opinion. In none of the
opinions does the Court discuss the problem of good faith and whether the observed inequalities of treatment reveal an intention to discriminate.
187But see Ex Parte Banks, 254 Ala. 117, 48 S. (2d) 35 (1950) holding that Negro
residents of the state who had taken advantage of a law entitling them to state-supported
legal education out of the state, the University of Alabama School of Law being closed
to Negroes, must pass the prescribed examination for admission to the Alabama bar-as
must all other graduates of out-of-state law schools-although (white) graduates of the
University of Alabama School of Law receive licenses automatically.
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mingling with his fellow students impaired his educational opportunities. Taking note of the fact that he was a candidate for a higher degree and that our society sorely needs qualified leaders, the opinion
emphasized the importance of association with other students as a
device for stimulating McLaurin's intellectual advancement.188 But
see where this argument leads. For whatever our need of leaders, it is
the particular attribute of democratic society that it must have intelligent followers well-qualified to choose among those seeking the privilege of leading. (Certainly it is not a democratic principle that special
privileges or advantages be given to self-nominated candidates for leadership.) If commingling with his fellow students was essential for
McLaurin, it can be cogently argued that it is of even greater importance to students of all races in American primary and secondary schools
in order that both the individuals primarily concerned and society at
large may secure the greatest possible advantage from the public educational program.189
Putting aside the educational importance of commingling, one may
wonder whether the real ground of the McLaurin holding was not an
unwillingness on the part of the Court to accept such a patent branding
of a segregee as untouchable. Yet the branding of McLaurin was no
different in principle from that which is imposed upon all segregees
under any system of separate public education. If, in the absence of
a separate colored school of education, the Court was right that McLaurin
had a constitutional right of entry to the University of Oklahoma and
if, being there, he had a constitutional right to exact equality of treatment with students of other races, is not the Court finding that, for
purposes of education, at least, McLaurin is very like his fellow students of other color? If the differences between Negroes and whites
do not warrant even minor differentiation in the educational opportunties afforded the races, is not the Court repudiating the necessary constitutional premise of separate schools, namely that race is a material
principle of classification for purposes of defining state policy in the field
of education.190 The McLaurin case, it appears, epitomizes the consti188 McLaurin

v. Oklahoma Board of Regents, 339 U.S. 637 at 641, 70 S.Ct. 851

(1950).
189 Infra

190 See

order.

at p. 249.
infra p. 250 as to the materiality of race to the objective of preserving peace and
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tutional vulnerability of the whole institution of enforced racial segregation.
The Gaines decision in 1938,1 91 now powerfully reinforced by
Sweatt and McLaurin, has wrought very substantial changes in segregation patterns in .American education.192 Thus, in October 1950, the
Education Editor of the New York Times reported:
"A survey of I 00 institutions of higher learning in the South,
conducted by this department, shows that much progress has been
made in breaching the segregation policy during the last ten years.
A decade ago not a single Negro could be found in the South's
'all-white' colleges, public as well as private. Today well over
191 305 U.S. 337, 59 S.Ct.
1 9 2 A number of state and

232 (1938).
lower federal cases have already been determined in large
measure on the authority of the Sweatt and McLaurin decisions. Thus, a three-judge federal court in Louisiana required the opening of the State University Law School to a Negro
applicant, the proposed separate Negro school not promising equality. Wilson v. Board
of Supervisors of Louisiana State Univ., (D.C. La. 1950) 92 F. Supp. 986, affd. 340 U.S.
909, 71 S.Ct. 294, reh. den. 340 U.S. 939, 71 S.Ct. 490 (1951). So also a three-judge
federal district court in Virginia issued an injunction requiring the University of Virginia
to admit a qualified Negro applicant to' its law school, the alternative offered him of education at Howard University with Virginia contn1mting to the expense not being equivalent. The N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1950, §IV, p. 10:2. See also Gray v. U. of Tennessee,
(D.C. Tenn. 1951) 97 F. Supp. 463; Parker v. U. of Delaware, (Del. Ch. 1950) 75 A.
(2d) 225; State ex rel. Brewton v. Board of Education of St. Louis, (Mo. 1950) 233 S.W.
(2d) 697, one branch of the decision sustaining a mandamus to admit a Negro high school
boy to a white high school where no equivalent course was offered at the Negro high
school; and McKissick v. Carmichael, (4th Cir. 1951) 187 F. (2d) 949, reversing Epps v.
Carmichael, (D.C. N.C. 1950) 93 F. Supp. 327. Gonzales v. Sheely, (D.C. Ariz. 1951) 96
F. Supp. 1004; Blue v. Durham Pub. School Dist., (D.C. N.C. 1951) 95 F. Supp. 441.
But the tide has not been all-engulfing. In Brown v. Ramsey, (8th Cir. 1950)
185 F. (2d) 225, a petition for relief against alleged inequalities of the separate school
system of the Fort Smith Special School District of Sebastian County, Ark. was denied on
the ground that no inequality was shown. An important decision sustaining the separate
common school system of South Carolina is Briggs v. Elliott, (D.C. S.C. 1951) 98 F. Supp.
529 [appeal pending in Supreme Court, Case #273, 20 U.S. L. Week, 3051, 3062,
(1951)] though Judge Waring, whose decision in Elmore v. Rice, (D.C. S.C. 1947) 72 F.
Supp. 516 holding a Negro entitled to vote in the South Carolina Democratic party primary
is well known, filed a vigorous dissent. The majority rested its holding in part upon the
ground that ". • • for 75 years segregation in the public schools • • • has received the
approval of the leading appellate courts of the country, including the unanimous approval
of the Supreme Court of the United States at a time when that court included Chief
Justice Taft, and Justices Stone, Holmes and Brandeis." 20 U.S. L. Week 2015. The
reference appears to be to Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 48 S.Ct. 91 (1927) discussed
supra at p. 218. As we read and re-read the case we find in it only that in the context of
a separate school system, Martha Lum's classification as colored was not unreasonable.
This opinion, like Sweatt v. Painter, (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) 210 S.W. (2d) 442 at 444,
reversed 339 U.S. 632, 70 S.Ct. 848 (1950) seems somewhat less than discriminating in its interpretation of authority. Bagsby v. Trustees of Pleasant Grove School Dist., (Tex. Civ. App.
1950) 20 U.S. L. Week 3036.
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1,000 Negroes are attending classes and study with white students
in the same libraries. . . . The greatest impetus for the breaching
of the color barrier has been caused by recent United States Supreme Court decisions."193
In the fall of 1950 there were said to be nearly 100 Negroes attending
the University of Oklahoma whereas six months before there had been
less than 25.194 At about the same time, the Yale University Law
School proposed that the Association of American Law Schools deny
membership to any institution excluding or segregating qualified applicants on the basis of race or color.195 Viewing these events, Federal
Security Administrator, Oscar R. Ewing, observed:
"Scarcely a month passes without some tangible reminder from our
courts that discriminatory practices in colleges and universities
must end. . . . The year 1950 may well have heard the deathknell for second-class citizenship in America's institutions of
higher education."196
Indeed, there seems to be fairly general agreement that racial separation
in public graduate and professional schools has been, in practical
effect, substantially foreclosed by the recent cases.197
But it is significant that the recent Supreme Court education decisions have been concerned only with segregated higher education.
While the impact of the holdings has had some effect in opening up
undergraduate colleges,108 the wall of separation in the primary and
193 N.Y.

TIMBS, Oct. 29, 1950, §IV, p. 9:2.
TIMBS, Sept. 10, 1950, §IV, p. 10:2.
195 Letter dated Oct. 24, 1950 from the Secretary of the Association of American Law
Schools to all members.
196 Addiess before the Twenty-Eighth Annual Conference of the Presidents of Negro
Land Grant Colleges, Federal .Security Agency, Washington, D.C., Oct. 18, 1950.
197 See Letters to the Editor, "Bias in Education," from Bishop Francis J. McConnell,
N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 19, 1950, §IV, p. 14:6; "Negro Gains Noted," from Roy Wilkins, N.Y.
TIMBS, Sept. 10, 1950, §IV, p. 10:6; and ''Negro Education Needs," from W. J. Trent,
Jr., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1950, §IV, p. 10:6. See also N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1950, §IV,
p. 10:2 and Oct. 29, 1950, §IV, p. 9:2.
198 Parker v. U. of Delaware, (Del. Ch. 1950) 75 A. (2d) 225. It has been reported
that the University of Louisville plans to close its all-Negro liberal arts college and, beginning September 1951, admit its nearly 400 Negro students to the hitherto all-white college
of liberal arts. N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 29, 1950, §IV, p. 9:2. As early as 1944, St. Louis University, a metropolitan institution of 9,000 students, eliminated racial barriers throughout all
of its departments. N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1950, §IV, p. 11:1. But W. J. Trent of the
United Negro College Fund finds such changes in the segregation pattern on the undergraduate level not yet significant. N.Y. TIMES, Letter, Nov. 12, 1950, §IV, p. 10:6.
1~ N.Y.
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secondary schools has not yet been breached.199 True, here there has
traditionally been at least some provision for colored education-of
however inferior quality-and hence the inequality is in degree perhaps less glaring than in the field of higher education where frequently
no alternative facilities have been available to Negroes. Moreover, it
has been urged that higher education"... is the place to begin to introduce the Negro into the main stream of American culture in any region
where a differential in treatment has denied him that entrance."200
Opponents of enforced separation, however, find these reasons for a
distinction as to segregation in primary and secondary education, on the
one hand, and college and profes_sional schools on the other, artificial.
The evidence is inescapable that separation on the lower levels typically
results in gross inequality of opportµnity; 201 the psychological impact of
singling out a minority for special treatment is the same in either
case;202 and it is patently ironical to open up eligibility for advance
study to students_ whose preparatory work is so inadequately provided
for that their chances to succeed are jeopardized in advance. 203 The
mid-point of the twentieth century seems a late date to discuss the best
place to "... begin to introduce the Negro into the main stream of
American culture." Certainly wherever the fact of inequality is clear,
racial separation in primary and secondary education, as well as on the
graduate and professional level, seems doomed by the Court's recent
decisions. But the step which would find in race itself an immaterial
principle of .classification for purposes of public education remains to
be taken.
Summary of Case Law on the Separate hut Equal Rule

The preceding discussion has reviewed the development of judicial
doctrine in the matter of state-enforced separation of the races. Largely
upon the authority of the pre-Fourteenth Amendment Roberts case204
199Carter v. School Board of Arlington County, (4th Cir. 1950) 182 F. (2d) 531;
Butler v. Wilemon, (D.C. Tex. 1949) 86 F. Supp. 397; Briggs v. Elliott, (D.C. S.C.
1951) 20 U.S. L. Week, 2015. But cf. State ex rel. Brewton v. Board of Ed., (Mo. 1950)
233 s.w. (2d) 697.
200 "At Jefferson's University," N.Y. TIMBs, Sept. 10, 1950, §IV, p. 10:2.
201 56 YALE L.J. 1059 at 1062 (1947).
202 Infra at p. 255.
203 Letter to the Editor, from Bishop McConnell, N.Y. Tn.ms, Nov. 19, 1950, §IV,
p. 14:6.
204 Roberts v. City of Boston, 5 Cush. (59 Mass.) 198 (1849).

1951]

THE SEPARATE BuT EQUAL DocTRINE

243

and the McCann decision205 in which the petitioner had relied primarily upon the privileges and immunities clause, the validity of separate
schools under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
came to be accepted in many states. Following these precedents, as well
as its own earlier decisions which had interpreted the commerce clause
rather than the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court in Plessy
v. Ferguson206 laid down the rule that reasonable separation by force of
state law is not invalid under the amendment provided that equivalent
facilities are afforded to members of both races. 207 Enunciated in the
field of intrastate transportation, the Plessy doctrine soon became widely
accepted authority for enforced racial separation in a variety of other
aspects of human relations where the kinds of interests at stake are
much different than in the case of the fleeting relations of fellow travelers upon an intrastate common carrier. Thus, in Gong Lum v. Rice208
Chief Justice Taft found separate schools to have been so "... many
times decided to be within the Constitutional power of the State..."
that the matter did not merit new consideration although in fact the
issue had never been presented, much less decided, in the Supreme
Court.
Recently, the Court had seized upon the "equal" factor of the
separate but equal formula to overthrow enforced racial separation as
actually practiced in a variety of circumstances. It has refrained, however, from expressly overruling the Plessy case.209 Hence, that case continues to stand today as authority for segregation where the Court is
satisfied as to the reasonable equality of the facilities offered.210 The
Supreme Court has made clear, however, that the standard of equality is
State ex rel. Garnes v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 198 (1872).
163 U.S. 537 at 547-551, 16 S.Ct. 1138 (1896).
207 Indeed, the equality factor of the separate but equal formula in the Plessy opinion
was implicit rather than explicit, the emphasis of the Court being upon the criterion of
"reasonableness." Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 at 550. But that separate facilities
could not be grossly unequal had been generally conceded since Sumner's argument in the
Roberts case, 5 Cush. (59 Mass.) 198 (1849).
205

206

275 U.S. 78 at 86, 48 S.Ct. 91 (1927).
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 at 636, 70 S.Ct. 848 (1950).
210 In Boyer v. Garrett, ( 4th Cir. 1950) 183 F .(2d) 582, where the validity of separate recreational facilities was at issue, the court said, "We do not think, however, that we
are at liberty • • • to disregard a decision of the Supreme Court which that court has not
seen fit to overrule and which it expressly refrained from reexamining, although urged to do
so. • • • It is for the Supreme Court, not us, to overrule its decisions or to hold them
outmoded."
20s
209
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a real one and not a legal £ction. and that segregation must fall where
inequality is manifest.

II
TowARD A SYSTEM FOR ANALYSIS

OF THE SEPARATE BUT EQUAL RuLB

What is to be said of the present status of the separate but equal
rule as an interpretation of the. equal protection clause? For an appraisal of its validity in terms of general principle, we must turn from
cases which have enunciated the rule to consider the interpretation
which the Court has put upon the equal protection clause in defining
the limits of the power of the state to classify among its citizens.
Equal Protection and the Power to Classify

It has long been conceded that the equal protection clause does not
place upon the states the obligation to accord to all of their inhabitants
identical treatment. 2 11_ Indeed, any such conception of uniformity
would be at war with flexible legislation rationally designed to meet
particular problems. What equal protection does require is, first, that
legislation which distinguishes in its treatment of different groups must
be founded upon real and relevant distinctions as between those who
are members of each group and those who are not, and second, that
differences in treatment as between groups must be reasonable. The
criterion of a relevant difference upon which a classification may properly be based is its materiality to the purpose of the enactment. It is not
enough that the classification be based upon real and substantial, rather
than merely fancied differences, but the differences must be pertinent
to the object of the law. 212 If they be immaterial to this object, then for
211 See generally, Ii.AM. ]UR. §470 et seq. and U.S. S.Ct. Dxc. "Constitutional Law,"
§§209-211.
212 "The question always is whether there is any reasonable ground for a classification
or whether it is only and simply arbitrary, based upon no real distinction." ". • • the
basis on which a classification may validly rest must be reasonable and founded on material
differences and substantial distinctions which bear a proper relation to the matters or per·
sons dealt with by the legislation and to the purpose sought to be accomplished." 12 AM.
]UR. 163-164. In State v. Mason, the Utah court aptly said, "The objects and purposes 0£
a law present the touchstone for determining proper and improper classifications." 94 Utah
501 at 508, 78 P. (2d) 920 (1938). See also Dominion Hotel v. Arizona, 249 U.S. 265,
39 S.Ct. 273 (1919); Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412, 57 S.Ct. 772
(1937); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 62 S.Ct. 1110 (1942); Groessart v. Cleary,
335 U.S. 464, 69 S.Ct. 198 (1948). See also Tussman and tenBroek, "Equal Protection
of the Laws," 37 CALIP. L. REv. 341 at 346 et seq. (1949).
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this particular purpose the classification is arbitrary, and the legislation
is by no means saved because the purpose of the statute itself is within
the general reach of state power13 and, for some other purpose, the
classificatory criterion might be appropriate. 214
Not only must the classification be material to a valid public purpose, but the treatment accorded to different groups must be reasonable.
This is not to say that variations of treatment as between groups must
be scaled with mathematical nicety in accordance with the facts upon
which the classification is founded. 215 Indeed, some inequality is no
doubt inherent in the process of classification itself;216 and it has been
traditionally held that so long as different groups are accorded substantially equivalent treatment, the requirement of equal protection is satisfied. 217 Recent authority seems to have broadened yet further the
play of state power. Thus, it has been held that where legislation is
fair upon its face, its administration in such a manner that substantial
inequalities result raises no.equal protection question unless it can be
shown that the discriminatory administration was intentional and in
bad faith. 218
21aThus, in Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm., 334 U.S. 410, 68 S.Ct. 1138 (1948)
a statute restricting the availability of fishing licenses of noncitizens was not saved by reason
of the fact that conservation of natural resources is a proper object for the exercise of state
power.
214 Gulf C. & S.F. R.R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 17 S.Ct. 255 (1897); Fountain
Park Co. v. Hensler, 199 Ind. 95, 155 N.E. 465 (1927).
215 ''The Fourteenth Amendment is not a pedagogical requirement of the impracticable. Exact wisdom and nice adaptation of remedies are not required. The crudities or
even the injustice of state laws are not redressed by it. The principle of equality • • • necessarily permits many practical inequalities, and classification is not invalid because it does
not depend on scientific or marked differences in things or persons or in their relations.''
12 AM. Jun. 159, citing inter alia Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S.
580, 55 S.Ct. 538 (1935), and 295 U.S. 767, 55 S.Ct. 647 (1935); and 1913B ANN.
CAS. 529. See also Frost v. Corp. Comm. of Oklahoma, 278 U.S. 515, 49 S.Ct. 235 (1929).
216 Thus, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals has written, "'Equality' like all abstract
nouns must be defined and construed according to the context or setting in which it is
employed. Pure mathematics deals with abstract relations, predicated upon units of value
which it defines or assumes as equal. Its equations are therefore exact. But in this sense
there are no equations in nature; at least not demonstrably so. Equations in nature are
manifestly only approximations • • • ; their accuracy depending upon a proper evaluation
of their units or standards of value as applied to the subject matter involved and the
objectives in view. It is in this sense that the decisions upholding the power of segregation
in the public schools as not violative of the Fourteenth Amendment, employ the expressions 'equal' and 'substantially equal' and as synonymous.'' Sweatt v. Painter, (Tex. Civ.
App. 1948) 210 S.W. (2d) 442 at 445.
211 Home Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 33 S.Ct. 312 (1913);
Frost v. Corp. Comm., 278 U.S. 515, 49 S.Ct. 235 (1929); and Great A. & P. Tea Co. v.
Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412, 57 S.Ct. 772 (1937).
218 Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 at 8, 64 S.Ct. 397 (1944), where the Court said,
''The unlawful administration by state officers of a state statute fair on its face, resulting
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In order that the equal protection clause may be brought to bear
either upon the choice of a classificatory criterion or the variations
of treatment accorded to different groups under the classification, it is
necessary to induce the Court to assert its power to review legislative
action. Here is encountered the classic doctrine of the presumption of
constitutionality.219 Conceding the primacy of the legislature as the
policy-making arm of the government and recognizing the limitations
of its own power to marshall and appraise the essential facts, the Court
has developed the doctrine that, so long as the legislature has acted
reasonably, the judiciary will not strike down enactments merely because in the same circumstances the Court might itself have arrived at
different policy decisions. 220 This historic rule has been accorded broadest expression in many recent cases of economic legislation.221 In the
past quarter-century, however, there has developed a significant qualification of the presumption of constitutionality. Where legislation irnin its unequal application to those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of
equal protection, unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or
purposeful discrimination."
219 The doctrine is put in a variety of ways. It is said that the courts will presume in
favor of constitutionality until the contrary appears. 12 AM. Jun. §521. Every presumption is to be indulged in favor of the validity of a statute. U.S. S.CT. DIG. ANN., "Evidence" §99-1. Where any state of facts can be conceived which would warrant the challenged exercise of state power, that state of facts must be presumed. Id., "Statutes" §§81,
106-108. The burden of showing invalidity rests upon one attacking a statute. Id., "Evidence" §101. For an early case foreshadowing the modem doctrine, see Livingston's opinion in Adams v. Storey, (C.C.D. N.Y. 1817) 1 Fed. Cas. 141 · at 141-142, No. 66.
See also Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 at 661, 8 S.Ct. 273 (1887); Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 at 684, 8 S.Ct. 992 (1888); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.,
220 U.S. 61 at 78, 31 S.Ct. 337 (1911). For a catalogue of principles which the court
has developed to avoid passing upon constitutional issues, see concurring opinion of Justice
Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 341 at 346-348, 56 S.Ct. 466 (1936).
See also Hamilton and Braden, "Special Competence of the Supreme Court," 50 YALE
L.J. 1319 at 1344 (1941) and Hamilton, "The Jurist's Art," 31 ~L. L. REv. 1073 at
1087 (1931).
220 "With the wisdom of the policy adopted, with the adequacy or practicability of
the law enacted to forward it, the courts are both incompetent and unauthorized to deal ••••
Times without number we have said that the Legislature is primarily the judge of the
necessity of such an enactment, that every possible presumption is in favor of its validity,
and that though the court may hold views inconsistent with the wisdom of the law, it may
not be annulled unless palpably in excess of legislative power." Justice Roberts speaking
for the Court in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 at 537-538, 54 S.Ct. 505 (1934).
See also Schreiber v. Cook County, 388 lli. 297, 58 N.E. (2d) 40 (1944).
221 For example, Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 at 537-538, 54 S.Ct. 505
(1934); South Carolina Highway Department v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 at 190-191,
58 S.Ct. 510 (1938). Say Hamilton and Braden, ''The cases upholding recent economic
legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment are too numerous to mention." "Special
Competence of the Supreme Court," 50 YALE L.J. 1319 at 1345, n. 98 (1941).
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pinges upon the basic civil liberties, particularly those freedoms of
political expression safeguarded by the First Amendment, the Court
does not recognize the same presumption of constitutionality that it accords to legislation dealing with economic affairs. 222 Recent cases-support the hypothesis that the presumption of constitutionality is also inapplicable where legislation is challenged as discriminatory against a
minority race or group. 223
Racial Classifications in Public Education

In the light of the foregoing principles let us note the factors upon
which, for example, the validity of racially segregated public schools
would seem to turn. 224 It will be convenient to proceed by commenting
briefly upon three fundamental questions:
222 The contrasting approach of the Court to legislation affecting economic and political
freedoms was strikingly shown in the decisions handed down on the same day in the
O'Gorman case (involving economic legislation, which was upheld) and the Near case
(involving a limitation of freedom of expressfon, which was struck down). O'Gorman and
Young v. Hartford Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251, 51 S.Ct. 130 (1931) and Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625 (1931). See 31 CoL. L. R.Bv. 1136 (1931); 36 CoL. L. R.Bv.
283 (1936); 40 CoL. L. R.Bv. 531 (1940); 41 YALE L.J. 262 (1931); 61 HARV. L. R.Bv.
1208 (1948). And see also Hamilton and Braden, "The Special Competence of the Supreme Court," 50 YALE L.J. 1319 at 1349 (1941).
But Justice Frankfurter has never conceded the validity of a distinction among constitutional rights in the application of the presumption of constitutionality. See his dissent
in West Virginia State Board of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 at 648, 63 S.Ct. 1178
(1943). See also his dissent in Kovaks v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 at 89 et seq., 69 S.Ct.
448 (1949), and note Justice Rutledge's comment thereon at 336 U.S. 77, 104 at 106.
228 In Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 at 216, 65 S.Ct. 193 (1944), Justice
Black for the Court stated, "It should be noted to begin with, that all legal restrictions
which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. ••• [C]ourts
must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny." See also Oyama v. State of California, 332
U.S. 633 at 646, 68 S.Ct. 269 (1948) and Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. (2d) 711 at 716, 198
P. (2d) 17 (1948). Cf. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 at 100, 63 S.Ct. 1375
(1943) and dissent of Justice Rutledge in Kotch v. Board of Harbor Commrs., 330 U.S.
552, 564 at 565-566, 67 S.Ct. 910 (1947).
If the reader will speculate as to the reasons which led to the discard of the presumption in the "free speech" cases, he will find at least some of these same reasons strongly
operative in the case of legislation impinging differentially upon minority groups. As to
the competence of the court as a factor, see Tussman and tenBroek, ''Equal Protection of
the Laws,'' 37 CALIP. L. R.Bv. 341 at 372-373 (1949). Cf. Hamilton and Braden, "The
Special Competence of the Supreme Court," 50 YALE L.J. 1319 at 1354-1356 (1941).
As to the doubtful effectiveness of democratic corrective processes, see Chief Justice Stone's
dissent in Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 601 at 605-606, 60 S.Ct.
1010 (1940): "I am not pursuaded that we should refrain from passing upon the legislative judgment 'as long as the remedial channels of the democratic process remain open
and unobstructed.' This seems to ine no less than the surrender of the Constitutional protection of the liberty of small minorities to the popular will.'' See also United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 at 152, n. 4, 58 S.Ct. 778 (1938).
224 Our concern here is primarily with defining a system of analysis. This system
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First. What is the purpose of laws which require separation of the
races in public education?
Second. Is race a criterion of classification which is relevant to the
purpose sought?
Third. Assuming the purpose is proper and that race is a relevant
criterion of classification, are the differences in treatment inherent in separate schools reasonable?
Purpose.of Racial Separation in Public Education. While perhaps
there is no single purpose which lies behind the separate education
laws, one may suggest several possible purposes which may have influenced the enactment of such legislation. No doubt many persons
sincerely believe that separation is essential to the development of the
most efficient public educational program, students of the white and
Negro races being thought to be of differing intellectual capacities and
separation making possible the education of each race in accord with
its particular abilities. Another possible ground for advocating separation might be to safeguard the public peace, it being thought that intermingling of the races would result in disorder because of fundamental
prejudices and antagonisms which the law cannot but take into account.
Yet a third possible purpose of separate education might be an intention
on the part of the dominant group to discriminate, to impose upon the
separated group the badge of an inferior caste, or at least to prevent
association between the dominant group and the unpopular minority.
Of the three purposes mentioned, it is clear that the furtherance of
the public educational program and the maintenance of the public
peace and order are proper functions of the state. Hence, to the extent
that these are found to be the reasons for separation, the constitutional
validity of the institution must be examined in terms of the materiality
of the racial classification to the purpose sought and the good faith
reasonableness of the differences in treatment accorded. On the other
hand, to the extent that an intent to discriminate is found to explain
the separation, the institution of separate schools would seem to fall at
once within the ban of the equal protection clause.22 is
would be appropriate equally to an examination of the validity of enforced racial segrega•
tion in other social relations-though the results of the analysis could, of course, conceivably
vary as between different types of segregation.
225 Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. (83 U.S.) 36 at 81 (1873). See also Frank and
Munro, "The Original Understanding of 'Equal Protection of the Laws,' " 50 CoL. L.
R:sv. 131 at 153-162 (1950). But cf. Wong Him v. Callahan, (C.C. Cal. 1902) 119 F.
381. To suggest that an intent to discriminate may be the real purpose behind separate
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The Materiality of Race as a Classification Criterion. (a) The educational objective. While there is a body of pseudo-scientific literature
which purports to demonstrate the innate intellectual superiority of
whites as compared with Negroes,226 this literature is now regarded by
psychologists and sociologists as obsolete, the modem view being that research has been unable to establish any significant difference in the innate mental capacities of the two races. 227 It is true that the evidence is
somewhat stronger as to interracial mental differences when environmental factors are taken into account. 228 But before concluding that
such differences warrant separation for educational purposes, consider
these two additional facts. There is a great deal of overlap between the
intellectual capacity of individuals of different races229 so that if the
purpose is to classify students according to mental ability, modem testing devices would seem to provide so much more reliable criteria than
does race that by comparison the latter becomes virtually arbitrary. Second, and perhaps more important, one of the major environmental
factors explaining the observed differences in Negro-white psychological test scores is almost certainly the separate education program itself
and the typically inferior opportunities it has offered to Negroes. 230 If
schools may seem a harsh interpretation, but see 49 CoL. L. REv. 629 at 637 (1949)
where it is said, ''Whatever their express purpose may be, segregation laws seem really to
represent an effort to impose on the racial minority the status of an inferior caste." To the
same effect, see McGovney, "Racial Residential Segregation," 33 CALIF. L. R:Ev. 5 at 27,
n. 94 (1945). See also 1 MYRDAL, AN AMERicAN DILEMMA 591, 629 (1944); Report of
the President's Committee on Civil Rights, To SECURE THESE llicHTs 79 (1947); 34 CoRN.
L.Q. 246 at 256 (1948); dissent of Justice Harlan in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537,
552 at 557, 16 S.Ct. 1138 (1896); and dissent of Judge Danforth in People ex rel. King
v. Gallagher, 93 N.Y. 438, 458 at 464-465 (1883). Cf. Linton, "The Vanishing American
Negro," 64 AM. MEnc. 133 at 139 (1947) and FRAENKEL, Oun CIVIL LIBERTIES 201-205
(1944).
226Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. (2d) 711 at 722-723, 198 P. (2d) 17 (1948), the court
concluding, at 724, that there is " ... no certain correlation between race and intelligence."
See also l MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 147-148 (1944); and 58 YALE L.J. 472 at
475 (1949).
2271 MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 144-153 (1944). See also Garrett, ''NegroWhite Differences in Mental Ability," 65 Ser. MoNTHLY 329, discussion at 66 id. 81-82,
173-174 (1947, 1948); KLINEBERG, RAcE DIFFERENCES 343 (1935); Linton, "The Vanishing American Negro," 66 AM. MEnc. 133 (1947); and authorities referred to in 58 YALE
L.J. 472 at 474-475 (1949).
22s 1 MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 147 (1944); Overstreet, "Mind of the Negro:
Notes on the Effect of Environment upon Intelligence," 28 SAT. REv. LIT. 7 (Sept. 8,
1945).
229 1 MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 149 (1944).
230 Thus, it was found that Negro children in Los Angeles, educated in the same
classroom with white children, had an average I.Q. slightly higher than that of their white
schoolmates. 58 YALE L.J. 472 at 475 (1949).
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it is separate schools which account for differences in mental capacity,
we are involved in a logical circle if we then say that the differences
justify the separation.231
The argument that race is an immaterial principle of classification, so
far as the purpose of an effective educational program is concerned, is not
limited to the negative analysis above. It is commonplace that public
education plays a vital role in evolving democratic society.232 Separate
schools, implying in many school districts cqstly duplication of facilities
and instruction or, at best, uneconm;nical sizes of educational institutions, tend to impair the quality of education that can be purchased with
the public tax dollar. 233 The implication of inferiority which segregation casts upon the minority group, an inferiority unsupported by scientific evidence, tends to perpetuate unfounded racial myths and prejudices and to shore up interracial barriers to the defeat of the broad educational goal of public enlightenment and advance of American culture.234 In short, "If education is life and growth, then it must be life
within a social group. Schools must be democratic communities wherein children live natural democratic lives with their companions."235
(b) The safeguarding of peace and order. The view that racial
segregation may contribute to preservation of the public peace is of long
standing.236 It regards interracial hostility as deep-seated, existing independently of any legislation,237 and holds that the legislature may wisely
restrict the possibility of this hostility manifesting itself in disorder by
minimizing opportunities for interracial contact.238 Opponents of sep281 It is conceivable that differences in Negro-white personality traits, other than
mental differences, might justify separate education, as, for example, differences in susceptibility to discipline or in tendency to immoral conduct. But there seems no responsible
authority to support such a hypothesis. See authorities cited, note 227 supra.
2 a2 See MEIKLBJOHN, Frum SPEECH AND !Ts R:sLAnoN TO SELF GoVBRNMENT 102
(1948) where the author inquires, "What ••• would be the use of giving to American
citizens freedom to speak if they had nothing worth saying to say?" In Shapiro v. Doran,
99 N.Y.S. (2d) 830 at 834 (1950), the court observed, "Public Education Laws are the
outgrowth of social legislation designed to give equality of opportunity to all children in a
society dedicated to the democratic ideal."
233 56 YALE L.J. 1059 at 1063 (1947); cf. 13 Mo. L. Rav. 286 at 286-289 (1948).
234 Cf. 1 MYRDAL, AN .AMERICAN On.EMMA 137-153, 644 (1944).
285 FRAsmR AND .Aro.mNTR.oUT, AN !NTRoDUCTION To EDUCATION, 3d ed., 33 (1933).
286 Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327 at 360-361 (1874); People ex rel. King v. Gallagher,
93 N.Y. 438 at 457 (1883).
237 Roberts v. City of Boston, 5 Cush. (59 Mass.) 198 at 209; Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 at 551, 16 S.Ct. 1138 (1896).
238 Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327 at 360 and cf. Harris v. City of Louisville, Buchanan
v. Warley, 165 Ky. 559 at 572, 177 S.W. 472 (1915) reversed in Buchanan v. Warley,
245 U.S. 60, 38 S.Ct. 16 (1917). But the strong emphasis of the early cases in which the
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arate schools attack this viewpoint on three grounds. First, they believe that in many cases it exaggerates the risks to the public peace of
mixed education.2311 Second, interracial prejudice in the community,
they argue, is nourished and fostered by race separation rather than existing purely independently of it.240 While prevention of interracial
contacts may prevent conB.ict so long as the separation continues,
it also prevents the understanding which comes from common associations and experiences and perpetuates a social climate in which race
superstition and prejudice B.ourish.241 Third, opponents of separate
schools dispute the premise that intelligent law-making is powerless to
combat racial prejudice. The elimination of separate public schools to
require a common educational experience for all children of the community, without regard to race, would, they believe, make an important
contribution to the improvement of interracial understanding.242
validity of separate schools was "established" was much more upon inherent racial differences which are now generally discounted. Supra note 226. Roberts v. City of Boston,
5 Cush. (59 Mass.) 198 at 208 (1849); People ex rel. King v. Gallagher, 93 N.Y. 438 at
450 (1883); Lehew v. Brummel, 103 Mo. 546, 15 S.W. 765 (1891); and see Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 at 551, 16 S.Ct. 1138 (1896).
239Thus, the New York Times, under headline, "St. Louis Improves Race Relations,"
has reported with respect to mixed education at St. Louis University: ''Not one untoward
incident has occurred on the ••• campus since Negroes were admitted•••• Their assimilation into campus life has been thorough ••••" N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 10, 1950, §IV, p. 11:1.
On Oct. 29, 1950, the same newspaper reported as follows: "Ten or even five years
ago Southern educators and other spokesmen for that region warned that any break in the
color line would cause riots and bloodshed. Now the situation has changed. Negro students are on the same campuses with the white students-and nothing untoward has happened. There have been no disturbances, no .demonstrations, no riots. Actually, in some
instances the white students have gone out of their way to make the Negro students feel
at home. • • • Educators generally agree now that the student, faculty and community
reaction has been good, even better than they had expected. The white and colored students go about their studies without any indication that a segregation problem exists." N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 29, 1950, §IV, p. 9:2.
See also "Fraternity Rejects Any Race, Color Bar," N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1950, p. 9:3;
"South Opens a Door," Id., Jan. 21, 1951, §IV, p. 8:3; and ''North Carolina U. Will
Admit Negro," Id., April 25, 1951, p. 31:5.
240 See Maclver's arresting discussion, "Which Way Are We Heading?" in THB
MoRB PERFECT UNION 39-51 (1948); see also 56 YAI.B L.J. 1059 at 1067 (1947).
241 See 1 MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN llir.:sMMA 625 (1944); MAcIVBn, THB MoRB
PERFECT UNION 67-70 (1948); Report of the President's Committee on Civil Rights, "To
SEcmm THBsE RrcHTS 82-87 (1947). In Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 at
96, 63 S.Ct. 1375 (1943), Chief Justice Stone remarked, "There is support for the view
that social, economic and political conditions which have prevailed since the close of the
last century, when the Japanese began to come to this country in substantial numbers have
intensified their solidarity and have prevented their assimilation••••" In an accompanying
note (320 U.S. 96 n. 4) he cites various race separation statutes.
242 The viewpoint that the legislature is powerless to combat prejudice is today under
vigorous attack. Thus, Ross has said, ''Two years of state FEPC's have done more to end
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In a test of separate schools under the equal protection clause, even
if it should appear that separation indeed tends to aggravate interracial
tensions, this need not be conclusive of their invalidity. The harsh
fact is that such things as race riots do occur, and no doubt in at least
some communities the problems of interracial relations are sufficiently
acute to warrant legislative attention. According to its customary canons
of interpretation, the Court is reluctant to inquire into the wisdom of
legislative policy so long as the legislators have reached their decisions
acting as reasonable men. 243 Absent evidence of a hostile motive and so
long as the legislation is fair on its face, the mere fact that it is founded
upon incorrect psychological analyses would not ordinarily serve to
place it in jeopardy before the equal protection clause. If, however, the
Court is indeed prepared to put aside the presumption of constitutionality where legislation making racial distinctions is at issue, then a showing that segregation aggravates social tension would become highly
relevant to judicial decision.
If, arguendo, the doubtful premise is conceded that separate schools
conduce to the maintenance of the public peace, there must yet be
considered the question of whether such an appropriate public end may
properly be sought by this particular means. Certainly the police power
is not unlimited but must be exercised with due regard for constitutional
restrictions. 244 Where First Amendment liberties are at stake it is well
established that the public interest in peace and order warrants no
lightly-considered infringement of individual right. 245 Although it
is true that First Amendment liberties weigh heavily upon the scales of
job discrimination than 50 years of private agitation, goodwill conferences and educational
campaigning." "Tolerance by Law," 195 HARPERS MAGAZINE 458 (1947). To the same
effect, Simon declared that wise legislation creates a climate of opinion in which discrimination tends to disappear. "Causes and Cure of Discrimination," N.Y. Tu.ms, May 29,
1949, §VI, p. 10 at 35. Compare Brophy, "The Luxury of Anti-Negro Prejudice," 9
Ptill. OP. Q. 456 (1945) where the author finds that among merchant seamen, at least, the
degree of anti-Negro prejudice is not dependent upon where a man comes from or how
well educated he is, but rather the number of times he has shipped with Negroes. See
also "Fair Educational Practices Acts: A Solution to Discrimination," 64 HA.nv. L. R.Bv.
307 (1950); and "The New York State Commission Against Discrimination," 56 YALE
L.J. 837 (1947).
243 We

apply here and in the sentences following the principles stated supra at p. 245.
Cf. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Kaw Valley District, 233 U.S. 75 at 79, 34
S.Ct. 564 (1914).
245 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 347 at 378, 47 S.Ct. 641 (1927); Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736 (1940); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 66
S.Ct. 1029 (1946); Sellers v. Johnson, (8th Cir. 1947) 163 F. (2d) 877 at 883.
244
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constitutional interpretation,246 the Court has already reached a similar
holding in connection with a challenge of the validity of residential
racial separation as a device to preserve the public peace.247 Thus, it
appears that the invocation of the public interest in peace and order is
not an answer to the constitutional question with respect to race separation but yet leaves to be weighed the impact upon individual right of
the particular program of separation adopted. 248
(c) The vagueness of racial classi-fications. Quite apart from the abstract materiality of race, as a classifying principle, to some appropriate
legislative end, there is a practical question of whether, in its application, such a principle is sufficiently definite to meet objections on
account of vagueness. 249 To the extent that a classifying criterion leaves
uncertain in what category particular individuals will fall, it tends to
become arbitrary as to these persons.250 On this score, the ambiguity
of such terms as Caucasian, Negro, colored, Mexican, or Japanese
raises doubt as to the propriety of use of such categories for legislative
classification with reference to matters affecting the rights, privileges
or duties of individuals, at least if without further definition. 251
246 Supra, note 222.
247Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 38 S.Ct. 16 (1917).
248 We have not here considered the possibility that the purpose of the legislature in
providing separate schools may simply be to respect the tradition and custom of the community, race being a long-established principle of classification in public education. Cf.
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 at 550, 16 S.Ct. 1138 (1896). No doubt, at any given
moment, custom goes far to explain the existence of separate schools in many communities.
It finds constitutional support in the principle that a classification is not invalid if it lacks
mathematical exactitude or precise theoretical or scientific uniformity so long as it has
a real basis in practical convenience. Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U.S. 352
at 370 et seq., 52 S.Ct. 595 (1932); 12 AM. }UR. §§481, 483. But whatever the availability of custom as a justification for other classifications, surely it is a cynical basis upon
which to defend separate schools against a charge that they are discriminatory. Cf. Shelley
v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 at 19-20, 68 S.Ct. 836 (1948); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633
at 646-647, 68 S.Ct. 269 (1948); and Justice Stone's dissent in Minersville School District
v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 601 at 605-606, 60 S.Ct. 1010 (1940). See also Ming, ''Racial
Restrictions and the Fourteenth Amendment," 16 Umv. Cm. L. REv. 203 at 207-212
(1949) discussing the complex reasons behind residential segregation.
249 That legislation which sets uncertain and indefinite boundaries to human freedom
is invalid under the due process clause is well established. See Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 at 311, 60 S.Ct. 900 (1940); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 at 151, 63
S.Ct. 862 (1943). Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 at 5-6, 69 S.Ct. 894 (1949). Cf.
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 45 S.Ct. 625 (1925). But we are here concerned
with the implications of an uncertain criterion in the context of the equal protection clause.
250 Thus, the California Supreme Court found that the miscegenation law of that state
would be invalid on the ground of vagueness even if it might otherwise have been upheld.
Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. (2d) 711 at 728-732, 198 P. (2d) 17 (1948). See also Small Co.
v. American Sugar Refining Co., 267 U.S. 233 at 239-241, 45 S.Ct. 295 (1925).
251 See MANGUM, LEGAL STATUS OF THE NEGRO, c. 1 (1940). See also Linton, ''The
Vanishing Negro," 64 AM. MEnc. 133 (1947) where the author observes, " .•• most
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That there is a problem of ambiguity as to racial classifications in
segregation legislation is evident from the language of a typical state
constitutional provision for separate schools (that of North Carolina)
which requires that"... the children of the white race and the children
of the colored race shall be taught in separate public schools...."252
The meaning of the terms "white" and "colored" is left wholly without
definition. On the strength of this provision, the North Carolina Supreme Court found it competent for the authorities to require attendance at separate colored schools by children having any ad.mixture of
Negro blood, however remote. 253 Yet at the time that this decision was
handed down, there was also in existence a provision in the North Carolina Constitution making unlawful intermarriage between a white
person and a person"... of Negro descent to the third generation."254
Thus, the children of a "white" marriage under the miscegenation provision might yet be required to attend separate colored schools if there
were a solitary distant Negro forebear2 55 (and so also their descendants
for all time though no new Negro blood were ever introduced into the
line).
Where discretion in the administration of a race separation law is
vested in officials making on-the-spot decisions in the light of personal
judgment as to whether, on appearance, an individual is of one race or
another, the uncertainties of such a law in its practical application are
manifestly multiplied. 256 Nor is certainty introduced merely because
an action may lie against an official making an erroneous judgment.257
anthropologists agree that there will be no Negro problem in another two hundred years;
by then there will not be enough recognizable Negroes left in this country to constitute a
problem."
252 North Carolina Const., Art. IX, §2. Typically, state constitutional provisions do
not deline the terms "colored" or ''Negro." See 47 AM. Jt1R. §216. See 34 CoRN. L.Q.
246 (1948) for legal tests of the different states as to who is a Negro.
253 Johnson v. Board of Education, 166 N.C. 468, 82 S.E. 832 (1914).
254 Art. XIV, §8. Query: What is the meaning of ''Negro" here'? Compare provisions
of the Mississippi Constitution, Art. XIV, §263 and Tennessee Constitution, Art. 11, §12.
For an interesting case involving the uncertainty of racial classifications, see State v. Treadaway, 126 La. 300, 52 S. 500 (1910) where the Supreme Court of Louisiana, by a divided
opinion, found defendant's marriage not a violation of the miscegenation statute.
255 This was precisely the holding of the South Carolina court in Tucker v. Elease,
97 S.C. 303, 81 S.E. 668 (1914). I do not mean to argue that in varying and diverse
contexts the term, ''Negro," need have a single uniform meaning. My point is simply that
segregation legislation ordinarily gives it no definition and that it is a term capable of a
great variety of possi"ble constructions.
256 See Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 at 374, 381-382, 66 S.Ct. 1050 (1946), as
to such a responsi"bility upon the operator of an interstate motor carrier, and the criteria
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Differences in Treatment under Separate Education

If the purpose of segregation is conceded to be a proper one, and
if, despite the indications of the discussion above, race is found to be
a material criterion of classification for the furtherance of such purpose, we then reach the issue noted above as to whether the use of the
racial criterion infringes individual right by subjecting any person to
unreasonably discriminatory treatment. The test of equal protection
here is whether separate school legislation is fair upon its face and
whether its administration is impartial.2118
(a) Psychological impact. Constitutional and statutory provisions
for separate schools typically require that colored schools be equal to
those available to white persons.259 Superficially, it may seem that such
a stipulation meets the requirement of fairness on the face of the legislation. But this ignores the fact that separation itself is not neutral but
inevitably strikes with differential psychological impact the groups concerned.260 Segregation is said to create a caste system which feeds upon
itself, growing increasingly malignant.261 Its spiritual effects accumulate, continuously estranging the two groups. 262 In a society dedicated
to freedom and equality the abnormal personality traits which segregation makes normal in the minority group constitute a tragic irony.268
to be employed for definition of a passenger's race. It is somewhat ironical that the PlessY
formulation grew out of the application of segregation legislation to a passenger who alleged
himself to be of % Caucasian blood and hence white under the ordinary miscegenation
provision. PlessY v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 at 538, 552, 16 S.Ct. 1138 (1896).
257 Plessr v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 at 548-549, 16 S.Ct. 1138 (1896).
258 Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 at 8, 64 S.Ct. 397 (1944).
250 See, for example, Art. XIlI, §1 of Ala. Const. of 1875. This constitutional requirement of equality was not included in the Alabama Const. of 1901, Art. XIV, §256.
260 "[T]here is a p5Ychological atmosphere created by 'jim-crowism' which produces
an inferiority complex in the Negro. • • ." 13 Mo. L. Rllv. 286 at 292 (1948). See
Deutscher and Chein, ''The PsYchological Effects of Enforced Segregation: A Survey of
Social Science Opinion,'' 26 J. OF PsYCHOLOGY 259 (1948); Cooper, ''The Frustrations of
Being a Member of a Minority Group,'' 29 MENTAL HYGmNE 189 (1945); McLean,
"PsYchodynamic Factors in Racial Relations," 244 .ANNALS OF AM. ACAD. OF PoL. AND
Soc. SCIENCE 159 (1946); Smythe, ''The Concept of 'Jim Crow,' " 27 SocrAL Foncns
45 at 48 (1948); Thompson, ''Mis-education for Americans,'' 36 StmVBY GRAPmc 72
(1947). See also 1 MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN ThLBMMA 545, 647-649 (1944). That Justice
Brown, upholding racial segregation, recognized a probability of a differential p5Ychological
impact of the practice, see Plessr v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 at 551, 16 S.Ct. 1138 (1896).
201 MAcIVBR, THB MoRB PERFECT UmoN at 65-68, 78 (1948); and cf. 1 MYRDAL,
AN AMERICAN Dn.BMMA 676-683 (1944).
2621 MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 644 et seq. (1944).
268 ''Experience with segregation of Negroes has shown that adjustments may take the
form of acceptance, avoidance, direct hostility and aggression, and indirect or deB.ected
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The unwholesome effect of segregation, while most marked in the
minority group, has a reflex action upon the dominant group as well.
The "logical and ethical contradictions" of the practice require "mental'
and emotional gymnastics" on both sides and tend to warp the personalities of whites as well as Negroes,264 though perhaps in different ways.
(b) Objective facilities provided. When attention is turned from
the inherent inequality in the subjective impact of segregation legislation to the objective record with regard to the provision of separate
educational facilities for Negroes, one finds that these facilities have so
typically been inferior to those available to white persons265 that a further question is raised as to whether a good faith effort has been made
to offer to the two races substantially equivalent educational opportunities. By whatever standard of comparison is employed,266 a substantial
inequality has typically existed upon the primary and secondary levels.
Since 1938 an increasing number of cases have shown that on the
level of higher education Negroes have heretofore frequently been
excluded from state universities when there has been no alternative provision for their education along the lines of their interest.267 When
such an omission is sought to be remedied, for example, by quick improvization of a separate colored school of pharmacy or law at a pre-exhostility. In seeking self-expression and finding it blocked by the practices of a society
accepting segregation, the child may express hatred or rage which in turn may result in a
distortion of normal social behavior by the creation of the defense mechanism of secrecy.
The effects of a dual school system force a sense of limitations upon the child and destroy
incentives, produce a sense of inferiority, give rise to mechanisms of escape in fantasy and
discourage racial self-appreciation." 56 YALE L.J. 1059 at 1061-1062 (1947) citing many
authorities.
264Thompson, "Mis-education for Americans," 36 StmVEY GRAPmc 72 at 120 (1947).
Cf. comment attributed to Booker T. Washington that the white man cannot hold the
Negro in the gutter without crawling in with him. 1 MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA
644 (1944).
265 56 YALE L.J. 1059 at 1062-1063 (1947) and authorities cited. To the same effect
see the Report of the President's Committee on Civil Rights, To SEctmE THESE RIGHTS
63-64 (1947); 1 MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 629 (1944); and Letter to the Editor,
from Bishop Francis J. McConnell, N.Y. T1MEs, Nov. 19, 1950, §IV, p. 14:6. Note too
the force of the fact that while psychological research finds no significant differences in
innate mental ability of white and Negro children, when the effect of environmental factors-of which school is surely one of the most significant-is taken into account comparisons
are typically to the disadvantage of the Negro. Supra at p. 249.
266 See 56 YALE L.J. 1059 at 1062-1063 (1947) where the results are presented of
comparisons according to average expense per pupil, average number of pupils per teacher,
average length of school term, and average teacher's salary.
267 Supra note 170.
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isting _Negro school of agriculture,268 one cannot anticipate that the
new institution will soon be able to offer a program comparable to that
of the established state university.
While the fact of statistical inferiority of the separate Negro education program is not conclusive of an intention by the state to discriminate against Negroes, the inferiority has been so general that it is
powerful evidence of such an intent. Yet, may not the intention be
abandoned, so that separation will be valid in the future? 269 The record
of the past gives little basis to hope for such an abandonment. Indeed,
American practical politics being as they are, is it not after all naive
to believe that an unpopular segregated minority-so long as it remains
separated--can hope to receive treatment equivalent to that which the
dominant group accords to itself.210 On this practical slant, can it not be
argued that a racial classification as to matters involving the taxpayers'
dollar tends inevitably to become discriminatory?

III
CONCLUSION

What now, is to be said of the separate but equal canon? The
scheme of analysis developed above leads to the conclusion that there
is no basis for it in the modem doctrine of equal protection. If, as appears likely, the Court is prepared to disregard the ordinary presumption of constitutionality in connection with racial legislation,271 the
"separate" factor of the formula would seem to be vulnerable either
by reason of its immateriality to any proper legislative purpose or by
reason of the inherent inequality which results from its application. On
the other hand, if the Court should conclude that race is a material criterion and reject the thesis of inherent inequality, then the "equal"
factor of the formula is not in line with modem constitutional theory
which would permit differences so long as they do not express a discrim268 State ex rel. Boyd v. Board of Control, (Fla. 1950) 47 S. (2d) 619; State ex rel.
Hawkins v. Board of Control, (Fla. 1950) 47 S. (2d) 608.
269 "Segregation Rule Praised by Byrnes," N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1951, p. 27:1, and
"Dual Racial Stand Voted in Georgia," Feb. 18, 1951, §l, p. 48: I. Contrast statement of
Dr. Ralph Bunche, reported in N.Y. TIMEs, April 1, 1951, §I, p. 1:6.
270 Maciver says of the separate but equal rule that the public services and facilities
made available to the Negro under it are"••• separate but in practice never equal." T:a:s
MoRB PERFECT UNION 37 (1948). See also 13 Mo. L. REv. 286 at 292 (1948); Cushman,
"The Laws of the Land," 36 StmVEY GRAPmc 14 (1947).
271 Supra note 223.
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inatory intent. If separation is valid at all, the proper test would seem
to be "separate but not discriminatorily unequal," a test which could
be met by a showing of good faith, such as Missouri sought to make in
the Gaines case272 despite very substantial differences in actual treatment. Whether Gaines or Sweatt or McLaurin could have sustained
his action under such a standard of equality is perhaps doubtful.
Why, then, does the Court adhere to this outworn doctrine which
is of such dubious ancestry? It is true that it has some dignity of age
and that it has been widely applied. But while the Court quite properly moves cautiously in overthrowing declared holdings, 273 where constitutional interpretations are at issue, it has recognized that the unavailability of a legislative remedy places upon it a special responsibility
to reconsider established doctrine against which meritorious objections
are raised. 274 In part, the refusal to overrule Plessy is no doubt based
upon the purely technical rule of the Court against considering constitutional questions where issues can be resolved without reaching
them. 2711 One cannot but wonder, however, whether a more realistic
explanation for the manner in which the Court has artfully dodged reconsideration of Plessy is not to be found in the Court's own interpretation of public policy. Does it not believe that substantial improvement
of the position of the Negro can be achieved by a stem insistence upon
the equality factor of the anomalous separate but equal rule while the
continuing availability of the rule is a safeguard against over-rapid social
change in those areas of national life in which separation of the races
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 59 S.Ct. 232 (1938).
Justice Rutledge observed: ''Precedent is not all-controlling in law. There must be
room for growth, since every precedent has an origin. But it is the essence of our tradition for
judges, when they stand at the end of the marked way, to go forward with caution, keeping
sight, so far as they are able, upon the great landmarks left behind and the direction they
point ahead." Dissenting in Application of Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 41 at 43, 66 S.Ct. 340
(1946). See Oliphant, "A Return to Stare Decisis," 14 A.B.A.J. 71 (1928).
274 Cf. Llewellyn, ''The Constitution as an Institution," 35 CoL. L. REv. 1 at 37
(1934), where the author points out, " ••• there is no appeal from the Court's precedent to any save the Court itself-or (has it been twice in our history?) to Amendmentor to a revolution." See also opinion of Justice Reed in Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S.
649 at 665, 64 S.Ct. 757 (1944) indicating, at n. 10, cases in which the Court has overruled prior precedents. And see CARDozo, THE NATURE OF nm JUDICIAL PnocEss 150 et
seq. (1921).
275 Thus, Justice Frankfurter, concurring in United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303,
318 at 320, 66 S.Ct. 1073 (1946) declared, " ••• the most fundamental principle of constitutional adjudication is not to face constitutional questions but to avoid them if at all
possible."
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is so firmly established that the Court hesitates to shake it? 276 In other
words, has the Court been unwilling to renounce the possible use of the
separate but equal canon to uphold separation with respect to types of
social contact as to which it regards the relative intensity of discriminatory
feeling as too great to be dealt with by direct attack upon enforced separation itself?277 If this is the unstated rationale which explains the reluctance to discard Plessy, it follows that the content of the equal protection
clause in this context is ultimately being limited by the force of local
opinion. It is said that hard cases make bad law. Surely the account
herein set forth of the development of the separate but equal rule makes
clear that bad law follows equally when the rights of minorities are
:rp.olded by the court to :fit the shape of public prejudice.278
The legal system is an expression of human life. Like a living
thing, it must grow and develop, or it will wither and die, bringing
down with it the society whose legal relations it manifests. American
law, including our constitutional law, has inherited the genius of English common law-equity jurisprudence for growth and development. 279
The interests given recognition and the relative evaluations accorded by
the courts to competing or conflicting interests are constantly changing.280 Justice Holmes said:
"[T]he provisions of the Constitution are not mathematical formulas having their essence in their form; they are organic living institutions transplanted from English soil. Their significance is vital,
276 See 46 MxcH. L. Rirv.
2 77 Compare, for example,

639 at 644 (1948).
the relative intensity of discriminatory feeling with respect
to the right of the Negro to vote or to serve on juries which try Negro defendants, and his
right to marry a (white) person of his choice. See Berger, "The Supreme Court and
Group Discrimination Since 1937," 49 CoL. L. REv. 201 at 202-204 (1949).
2 78 Contrast Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064 (1886).
279 ".•• law is not an end, but a means to an end-the adequate control and protection of those interests, social and economic, which are the special concern of government
and hence of law; that ••• end is to be attained through the reasonable accommodation of
law to changing economic and social needs, weighing them against the need of continuity
of our legal system, and the earlier experience out of which its precedents have grown••••"
Stone, "The Common Law in the United States," 50 HARV. L. REv. 4 at 20 (1936). See
also Llewellyn, ''The Constitution as an Institution," 34 CoL. L. REv. 1 at 31-33 (1934);
Hamilton and Braden, ''The Special Competence of the Supreme Court," 50 YALE L.J.
1319 at 1356 (1941); Hamilton, "The Jurist's Art," 31 CoL. L. REv. 1073 at 1083-1084
(1931).
2s0TJms, in Tignor v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 60 S.Ct. 879 (1940), the Court upheld
a challenged statute against prior case authority in point, Justice Frankfurter observing
that the force of the precedent had been " ••• worn away by the erosion of time." Id. at
147. For discussion of the emergence of a legally protected interest, see Warren, ''The
New Liberty Under the Fourteenth Amendment," 39 HARV. L. REv. 431 (1926), dealing
with the development of the doctrine of free speech as a fundamental liberty.
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not formal, it is to be gathered not simply by taking the words and
a dictionary, but by considering their origin and the line of their
growth."2s1
Whether the Massachusetts court correctly found no invasion of
the legally protected interests of Sarah Roberts when she challenged the
separate schools provided for her education in 1849 surely cannot be
determinative of the validity of enforced social separation of the Negro
race from its fellow citizens in 1951. No doubt Hamilton and Braden
are right that for the :6.nal "... protection of the rights of men, the
people of the United States must look to the people of the United
States."282 Yet unless judicial review is to be wholly abandoned, when
the issue is squarely raised, surely it is within the American scheme
that the Court shall adjudge what the social will really is where the
legislature enacts a statute alleged to run counter to the social compact
upon which the structure of the government is erected. 283
281Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604 at 610, 34 S.Ct. 693 (1914).
282 Hamilton and Braden, ''The Special Competence of the Supreme Court," 50 YALE
L.J. 1319 at 1357 (1941).
283 On this view, the Constitution, in the rights and freedoms that it guarantees to the
individual, reHects a carefully considered morality of freedom to which we, as a nation,
dedicate ourselves. The nation being so dedicated, the greater the evidence that challenged
legislation is discriminatory in fact (and the more vulnerable and despised the group
affected by it) the firmer the ground for thorough-going judicial review on the theory that
the statute is not consistent with the abiding and fundamental moral intention of the nation.
The identification of morality and intention here assumes that we, as a nation, intend to
respect those rights that we agree to respect. While law and morals are by no means the
same, neither are they unrelated.
See Luscky, "Minority Rights," 52 YALE L.J. 1 at 15-19 (1942) as to the social interest in vindication of minority rights. See also MElXLEJOHN, Frura SPEECH AND !Ts RELATION TO SELP GOVEIINMENT, c. 1 (1948).

